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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to examine the relationship among CEO's networks and 
companies' performance. Accordingly, two contradicting theories are rooted 
in this study that estimates the opposing results respectively. In proportion 
to social network theory, some would predict a positive linkage between the 
CEO's networks and performance of entities; whereas the agency theory 
anticipates a negative relationship exist in the CEO's networks and financial 
performance of the companies. Derived from the measures that employed in 
this study to evaluate the CEO's networks effect, the empirical results for 
I 00 non-financial companies in Malaysia suggest that CEOs with longer 
tenure build stronger networking and the companies with large board size 
are keenly looking for CEOs with an outsized social network. As well, it is 
observed that the CEO's networks have significant effect on companies' 
performance particularly sales growths in positive manner. However, 
neither any significant relationship can be observed between the CEO's 
networks and return on assets. Lastly, some facts are able to ascertain in 
Malaysia context for the argument that better-connected CEOs delivery 
value to companies performance in the course of their social network as 
consistent with social network theory. ln future study, it is suggested to 
employ different and large sample size in same setting, or different site 
location in addition to considering different boundary condition of social 
ties. 
Keywords: CEO, Social Networks, Companies Performance 
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ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji hubungan antara rangkaian ketua 
pengawai eksekutif (CEO) dan prestasi syarikat. Sehubungan itu, dua teori 
yang bertentangan dilandaskan dalam kajian nu masing-masing 
menjangkakan dapatan hasil kajian yang menentang. Selaras dengan teori 
rangkaian sosial, ada yang akan meramalkan hubungan positif antara 
rangkaian CEO dan prestasi kewangan entiti; manakala teori agensi pula 
menjangkakan hubungan negatif antara rangkaian CEO dan prestasi 
kewangan syarikat. Bertitik tolak daripada ukuran telah diterapkan oleh 
kertas kerja ini untuk meninjaui kesan rangkaian CEO, keputusan empirik 
bagi I 00 syarikat-syarikat bukan kewangan di Malaysia telah menunjukkan 
bahawa CEO dengan tempoh lebih Jama membentuk rangkaian lebih kuat 
dan syarikat-syarikat dengan saiz lembaga yang besar secara giat mencari 
CEO yang memiliki rangkaian luas. Selain itu, adalah diperhatikan bahawa 
rangkaian CEO mempunyai kesan nyata terhadap prestasi syarikat 
terutamanya pertumbuhan jualan secara positif. Akan tetapi, tiada sebarang 
hubungan yang ketara dapat ditemui antara rangkaian CEO dan pulangan ke 
atas aset. Akhir sekali, beberapa fakta dapat dikenalpasti dalam konteks 
Malaysia dan berhujah bahawa CEO yang terhubung baik membawa nilai 
kepada prestasi syarikat menerusi rangkaian mereka dan ini selaras dengan 
teori rangkaian sosial. Bagi kajian masa depan, adalah dicadangkan 
menggunakan saiz sampel yang berbeza dan besar dalam persekitaran yang 
sama, atau lokasi berlainan di samping itu mempertimbangkan keadaan 
sempadan hubungan sosial yang berbeza. 
Kata Kunci: CEO, Rangkaian Sosial, Prestasi Syarikat. 
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1.1 Background of Study 
Does a social network have an effect on the companies' performance? And 
if it so, it is relevant to further predict: how do the social networks of a key 
executive director in a corporate such as connected chief executive officers 
(CEO) will be at the company stage? Common belief proposes that CEOs 
regularly hold their position embeddedness via the course of personal 
relation instead of vivid performance in career area (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). 
A favouritism pattern of CEO appointment course in this relations manner 
sometime raise some concerns of intimate threat which conflict with best 
practice in director nominating process and undermine the strength of 
corporate governance (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2007; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Hwang & Kim, 2009; and 
Kramarz, and Thesmar, 2013). In contrast, such network of key executives 
also values added to the company performance in the way of shaping a 
valuable conduit to access key information and resources (Cohen, Frazzini, 
& Malloy, 20 IO; Engelberg, Gao & Parsons, 20 I 2; Fang, Francis & Hasan, 
2012; Hochberg, Ljungqvist & Lu, 2007; and Lacker, Eric & Wang, 2013). 
Accordingly, this study seeks to initiate an empirical study to verify whether 
a common belief concerning CEO's personal relations is merely an idea 
possible be perceived as the trendy fallacy or perhaps it, in fact, a vivid 
expression to the actual state of affairs. Specifically, this study aims to 
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identify in which situations the boards consider that it is imperative to 
appoint better-connected CEOs who attached with sound networks and 
whether the board composition in the least has some weight on the social 
network attributes of CEOs being appointed. Eventually, it is the key 
concern of this study go further to identify whether the social network of 
better-connected CEOs indeed values adding or cost to the detriment of 
companies. The answer to these inquiries highlights the imperative concerns 
toward shareholders' interest, corporate governances, institutional 
composition, and incentive measures among the board and companies. 
On the account of their headship function and umque attributes, it is 
unquestionably those CEOs who act as key person in fact occupied a 
strategically significant position of exerting critical influence to drive every 
piece in the operating environment work in concert seamlessly with the aim 
of pursuing desirable performance (Adams, Almeida & Ferreira, 2005). 
Preceding studies have long presumed that CEOs post heterogeneous 
compensations and successions that map to the performance of companies 
(Fang et al., 2012; Hubbard & Palia, 1995; Hamid, 1995; and John, Robert 
& David, 1999), however, few of the concerns have drawn to which specific 
attribute of CEOs is significant to companies' performance or such attribute 
is regarded valuable in the eyes of board committee in seeking a suitable 
CEO candidate. One of the critical personal attributes of CEOs that rarely 
focused is the subject of study that is personal social networks of CEOs. 
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Social networks is a term of occurrence that has lashed across business 
domain in recent decades (Katz, Lazer, Arrow & Noshir, 2004; Kramarz, & 
Thesmar, 2013 ;  Plickert, Ct, & Wellman, 2007; and Subrahmanyam, 2008). 
However, in spite of its latter-day credentials, social networks in favour of 
business activities are rather a fresh phenomenon. The notion of building 
personal social networks and trigger accessed to potential information base 
via keenly 'networking' is a long subsisted practice. The circulate byword 
'the matter is "who you know" rather than "what you know" has been 
frequently cited in the framework of network development (Hochberg et al., 
2007; and Plickert et al., 2007). It is a fair reflection of affairs connected to 
the notion that individual affiliations and ties arrive at the kernel of business. 
At present, social networks meant for business are significantly in trend. 
Social networks have growing seized greatly concern of scholars and 
practitioners as regards its potential act as new means to improve company 
performance (Fang et al., 2012; Shivaram, Venkatachalam, & Kotha, 2003; 
Hochberg et al., 2007; and Larcker et al., 2013). 
In Malaysia context, social and business connections are a core facet of 
practically the entire economic activities. Similar to the institutional 
background of emerging economy in the Asian region, Malaysia principally 
hinges on relation-based network governance in which the majority 
transactions were rooted in personal or implied agreement (Gomez & Jomo, 
1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; and Gui, 2006). 
Personal covenant among parties in the market that derived from their 
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reciprocal relation sometimes is more influential than formal procedures. 
Frequently, such connections act as a channel in support of interpersonal 
and inter-parties patronize, force, and information exchange. For instance, 
Hochberg et al. (2007) propose that whilst society is rooted in a multifaceted 
set of connections, it is the same way for companies context and in the 
course of keenly networking, individual be capable of promoting at a 
favourable position over others. The linkages among personal in such 
connections imply the key conduits as information is interflowed, capitals 
are distributed, new affiliations are developed, and present ties are leveraged. 
However, the networks of the executive directors such as CEOs indeed are a 
double-edged sword will possibly impinge on company performance 
favourably or detrimentally (Adams et al., 2005, Harfod & Li, 2007; and 
Kramarz & Thesmar, 2013). In spite of the sizeable studies concern on social 
networks; the evidence regarding whether such connections improve company 
performance is varied. In accordance with prior literature, the consequence 
can be derived from two foremost bases (Kramarz & Thesmar, 2013).  At the 
outset, the "Social Network Hypothesis" suggests the personal relationships 
can constitute proxy for improved company performance (Cohen et al., 
2010; Fang et al., 2012; Hochberg et al., 2007; and Lacker et al., 2013). 
A sound linked CEO being exposed via weak ties to the varied group of 
people, resources, and information framework. CEO is capable of 
leveraging their network positions to facilitate assess for the networks with 
the aim to support efficient transfer of know-how, technology and 
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information flow (Hochberg et al., 2007). Consequently, a company with 
well-linked CEO possibly will experience arise in company performance. In 
contrast, the "Agency Cost Hypothesis" (see Fich & Shivdasani, 2006) 
states that directors who attached several relationships are inclined to be 
overcommitted and often related to the underperformance of corporate 
governance and weak keenness to company performance. Also, excessive 
freedom and supremacy of CEOs position may leverage the networks to 
self-benefit result in agency cost and harmfully impact the performance. 
Even if scores of hearsay myths and recent studies of scholars have further 
proposed positive values of social networks, still, it appears to be a difficult 
task to establish, refute, or epitomize the connection among social networks 
and companies' performance. 
Hence, this study seeks to keep on this strand of the query by examining 
which of the foregoing two contradicting hypotheses dominates in Malaysia 
context. Malaysia poses numerous distinctive features that lead it principally 
fitted to examine the influence of networks on company's performance. At 
the outset, the perceived nature of the relation-oriented economy in 
Malaysia suggests that the value of networks is expected to be prevailing 
than in the market based structure in Western nations (Gomez & Jomo, 
1997). Next, large and family-owned companies are common in Malaysia 
market wherein top families' groups were worth of majority portion of 
Malaysia's gross domestic product (Haslindar & Fazilah, 2 0 1 1 ) .  Finally, 
Malaysia similar to other Asian economies is regularly marked as cronyism 
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structure and severe evidence imply that politicians employ their influences 
to appoint or serve for the benefits of intimate relatives and friends (Gui, 
2006). Thus, this study is specifically initiated to examine the networks of 
CEOs under the theme of listed companies in emerging economy namely 
Malaysia and identify whether such networks shape a value adding or 
damaging to company performance. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In this study, the underlying problem to be studied is: "what is the value of 
CEO's networks in a company?" There are an argument and doubt in 
examining the determinants and the implication of CEO's networks to the 
performance of the managed company (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003). Attempts 
to study in which situation the board will regard it is crucial to seek a CEO 
with better-tied networks in a selection process and whether such social ties 
delivery advantage or indeed a detriment to company performance is urged 
to be inspected (Fan, Wong & Zhang, 2007; and Mather & Ramsay, 2007). 
Despite several common beliefs and empirical studies in recently advocated 
the constructive values of social networks, yet, an effort to examine, 
ascertain or typify the relationship between the networks of an executive 
director and companies' performance indeed a difficult task. 
Moreover, top-level executives of a company in a position engaged in the 
far-reaching and multifaceted connection of social networks (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2003; and Cai & Sevilir, 2012). Instead of the formal boardroom, 
CEOs and executive director are greatly networked via charity foundations, 
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golf club, chambers, and political parties (Cohen et al., 20 IO; Fan et al., 
2007; and Plickert et al., 2007). To this, it is relevant to examine: what are 
the determinants of CEO's networks and its implication on performance. 
Sizeable evidence in above studies has been established that the networks of 
CEO exert influence on company context in various backgrounds such as 
compensation level (Bulter & Gurun, 2012; and Horton, Yuval & George, 
2012), CEO turnover (Kramarz & Thesmar, 2013) or corporate governance 
(Brown et al., 2012). A little contemporary studies were particularly 
concerns the relationship of CEO relations with key decisions and economic 
outcomes. For instance, only few emerging studies recently focused in the 
site of the United State (US) and United Kingdom (UK) both support such 
CEO' s networks shape a noteworthy power on firm values and companies 
performance (Adams et al., 2005; Fang et al., 2012; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; 
and Kirchmaier & Stathopoulos, 2008). 
From it, comparatively few studies, particularly focus in emerging 
economies such as China (Fan et al., 2007), Korea (Nam & An, 2017) and 
Nigeria (Oyewale, Oloko & Olweny, 2016), are known regarding the 
possible value of CEO's social relations in driving the key decision-making 
and company performance. In Malaysia, there has no study to measure the 
CEO's networks and listed companies' performance. The value of CEO's 
networking to smooth the progress of economic exchanges is further 
apparent in emerging countries like Malaysia on the account of extensive 
extents of market deficiencies, existence of institutional vacancies, and the 
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political influences as the key market forces (Li, 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002). Severe researches in the strategic management and organization 
areas employing input from emerging economies such as China have 
documented that networking connections with politicians and director 
interlocks contribute to enhanced performance (Gao, Xu & Yang, 2008). 
Accordingly, top executives of companies in developing economies keenly 
build and expand networking ties with powerful politicians, bureaucratic 
representatives, and society figures to assure superior access and ease the 
smooth transfer of resources, know-how, or information in support of the 
activities performance for companies (Gao et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2007). 
To furnish some insight about the value of CEO's networks in Malaysia, it 
is critical to examine of the history of political, economic and societal 
environments since it shape an intense forces on companies' practices. La 
Porta, Lopez, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) asserted the execution of New 
Economic Policy (NEP) as well as Industrial Coordination Act contribute to 
value of social networks in overcome the uncertainty in Malaysia. Such 
phenomenon prompted the important as regard with proper utilization of the 
key executives' networking especially CEOs in substitute of legal and 
institution loopholes in Malaysia (Stephen, 2012). The networks of CEOs 
are crucial to assist business growth and venturing in Malaysia (Tan, 2008). 
In fact, a study of social networks is rather an unmarked topic. Over past 
several decades, there was growing interest at the glimpse of investors, 
practitioners, and scholars being concerned on the theme of social networks 
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and probed into examining the influence of social relations and personal 
connectedness in company context (Coleman, 1990; Fang et al, 2012; 
Granovetter, 1985; and Subrahmanyam, 2008). Some has focused their 
study to examine the relationship between corporate governance measures 
as the predictor to assess the networks' strength of directors and top 
executives in the boardroom. Nguyen-Dang (2012) assert that CEOs with 
longer tenure tend to form powerful networks base and secure her position. 
Yermack (1996) observes large boards are likely to embed right CEOs in 
office such as equipped with better connection background. The same result 
is true in Brown, Gao and Stathopoulos's (2012) study. Yet, Subrahmanyam 
(2008) has established a linkage between board independence and networks. 
However, the majority preceding literature primarily examines the 
consequences of boards' network to the corporate governance aspect in term 
of "interlocking". Accordingly, the scope of "interlocking" is more 
concerning on existing relationship of external directors and often highlights 
the possible setbacks of such relationships (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; and 
Fracassi & Tate, 2012). However, it ignores other connection such as weak 
ties and prior linkages which serve as critical information intermediary 
among difference clusters and more significant than strong ties in enabling 
the transfer of key information from wider networks (Granovetter, 2005). 
Hence, the discussion concerning the networks of CEOs gives rise to an 
imperative question worth to be scrutinized. Often, the nature and 
consequence of directorial networks on company performance are vague 
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and mixed, conditional on the focus of the research. Fundamentally, the 
directions of research query on the subject of the networks can be divided 
into two branches: i) whether the networks of CEO delivery advantage to 
the company or ii) it indeed charge a cost? 
In term of advantage, the social capital researchers assert that social 
relations between the directors and top executives do delivery benefits to the 
company seeing that executives enjoy prestige in building personal ties and 
such networks act as conduit that stimulates the pass of entry to a wider 
flow of information exchange at minimum cost, expertise, innovative 
practices, and enhances its credibility, impact, and promptness (Cohen et al., 
201 O; Hochberg et al., 2007; and Lacker et al., 2013). For instance, Adams 
and Ferreira (2003) observed the networks furnish executives an advantage 
to seize opportunities, handle threats, and enhance decision making. 
In term of detriment, few researchers hold agency hypothesis proposes that 
CEO's networks are weakening corporate governance practice seeing that 
agency costs emerge as a conflict of interest by assuming the managers who 
have unrestricted power will pursue of their own benefits. For instance, 
some evidence implies that substantial director connections particularly 
related to CEOs are positively linked to the favoured nomination, excessive 
compensation, poor governance and loss-making merge (Fracassi & Tate, 
2012; and Kramarz & Thesmar, 2013). Also, better-connected directors 
perhaps linked to busyness and value-destroying activities such as 
corruption (Ferris et al., 2003; and Fich et al., 2007) 
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This study, thus mainly concentrated on the study with regard to the 
networks of executives that are: what are the relations among the CEO with 
the board members in the same company or across boardrooms, and the 
consequence of networks on the performance of companies in Malaysia. 
1.3 Research Questions 
Given the relation-oriented background of Malaysia setting, the networks 
are the imperative facet to facilitate economic exchange and influence 
business operation. Explicitly, this study strives to address the following 
research questions which including: 
1 .  What is the relationship between CEO tenure and the networks of CEO of 
Malaysian listed companies? 
2. What is the relationship between board size and the networks of CEO of 
Malaysian listed companies? 
3. What is the relationship between the networks of CEO and sales growth 
in Malaysian listed companies? 
4. What is the relationship between the networks of CEO and return on 
assets in Malaysian listed companies? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This study utilized company level data in Malaysia context with the aim to 
seize an apparent depiction of CEO's networks across these companies. 
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Explicitly, a study is initiated in this study empirically examine the 
consequences of CEO's connectedness on key decision-making and 
economic performance. Thus, the study has outlined following objectives: 
1 .  To examine the relationship between CEO tenure and the networks of 
CEO of Malaysian listed companies. 
2. To examine the relationship between board size and the networks of CEO 
of Malaysian listed companies. 
3. To examine the relationship between the networks of CEO and sales 
growth in Malaysian listed companies. 
4. To examine the relationship between the networks of CEO and return on 
assets in Malaysian listed companies. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Justified in the research value, the study in exammmg the networks of 
executives particularly CEOs with regard to company performance rs 
perceived relevant to policymakers, reporting users, interested researchers 
and foreseeable concerned parties. Explicitly, this study is imperative both 
facets in theoretical and practical as outlined in below. 
1.5.l Theoretical Significant 
Broadly, this study devotes to extend accounting literature on the current 
body of knowledge in relating to the networks of CEO from two means. 
Initially, this study suggests a new method for measuring the networks in 
12 
emerging economic particularly Malaysia which derived from the personal 
background of candidates serve in directors board of listed companies. Such 
method permits a way to gather the fairly sizable sample of Malaysian 
companies in favour of this study and to get rid of any clear and detailed 
relations ties will disturb the expected results. 
Also, such method indeed is a fair reflection of unique relational pattern in 
Malaysia context. In view of that, this study thus pursues the suggestion of 
Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) to consider the weight of putting the CEO, 
rather the board as a construct variable of social network analysis. 
Concurrently, it also deepens the scope of recent accounting literature that 
furnishes evidence as regards the particular board or companies' feature 
which shape the choice of CEO in term of personal social connection 
structure (Adams et al. 2005; Allgood & Farrell, 2003; Fracassi & Tate, 
2 0 1 1 ;  John et al., 1999; John, Nandu, & Schloetzer, 20 IO; Harford & Li, 
2007; Larcker et al., 2013 ,  and Lu, 2007). 
Next, as discussed in the foregoing section even the networks have been 
examined widely in the literature yet the measures are somewhat restricted 
to board or existing relationships. This study is assumed theoretically 
noteworthy in this regard as it proposes new measures of the CEO's 
networks. With employing on an original and more inclusive measure of the 
social network, it is expected to be able to assess the consequence of CEO's 
networks much more specifically than the earlier researches. 
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1.5.2 Practical Significant 
As outlined in the problem statement, this study is expected to some extent 
contribute a practical substance in the context of Malaysia. An examination 
of this study on the influence of CEO's networks and to company 
performance will offer practical implication via performing the unique case 
study in the setting of Malaysian background. From the empirical analysis, 
this study is expected will furnish some shred of lights and added guidance 
in support of policymakers and regulatory authorities, particularly Malaysia 
and other emerging nations. Key practical lessons can be seized via taking 
into account the influences of CEO's networks to company performance. 
These inputs can be aptly tailored by regulatory bodies with the aim of 
enhancing existing corporate governance mechanism. 
Another contribution of this study is verifying of a relative positive 
implication of CEO's networks on company performance m Malaysia 
context. Such result replenishes the gap of related studies m emerging 
markets and thus enriches international evidence as regards the value of 
networks in existing literature (Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Karrnarz & Thesmar, 
2013; and Plickert et al., 2007), and deepen findings from the US and the 
UK (Cohen et al., 2010; and Larker et al., 2013). The observed findings are 
compatible with related studies of Adams et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. 





1.6 Scope and Limitations of Study 
The scope of this study emphasizes the networks of CEO in Malaysia. Using 
an inclusive measure of CEO's networks, this study sought to convert myth 
about the networks value into evidence on its significance in the company's 
decision making, and its eventual consequence on company performance. 
Thus, the scope of study can be divided into two specifically diverse focuses. 
At the outset, this study seeks to identify the determinants of CEO networks, 
thus in what situation the boards deem it is crucial to find a connected CEO. 
Second, this study goes further to examine how the networks of CEO 
influence the company performance . 
One of the most evident limitations of this study is the cross-sectional 
design. As a result, definite conclusions regarding the directions of 
relationship entailed in our models would difficult to be underlined. Hence, 
relationships between variables ought to be interpreted with watchful. 
Similarly, analyses of models utilizing two-stage regressions modeling also 
have no verification of relationship direction. 
Another limitation of this study is the selected sample merely focuses to top 
I 00 non-financial listed companies according to their market capitalization. 
Such sample is a fairly small amount of the total population of listed 
companies. Hence, a study with larger sample size is much preferable to 
enhance generalization and validate the findings in this study . 
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Next, a limitation of this study is data gathering was confined to one site 
which is Malaysia. Due to the difference in the setting, the results of this 
study would not be applicable or fairly reflect the situation in other nations. 
For instance, the findings may not reflect the situation in the US setting. 
1.7 Organization of Study 
The remaining of the study is arranged as following structure: the next 
section reviews the preceding literature on underpinning theories: social 
networks and agency theory related to the topic of this study with some 
discussion of key variables, while Chapter 3 outlines the methodology 
design of the study and develops the corresponding hypotheses on the 
construct of interests. Chapter 4 describes the data and presents the results. 
Also, the related findings are discussed in this chapter as well. Chapter 5 
concludes and summaries the key findings in accordance with research 
objectives. The noteworthy of these findings and their implications are 
addressed. Also, some limitations of this study are being examined. At the 
end, some suggestions for future study are highlighted. 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter offers an outline of the study with underlining the background 
of the selected topic, a statement of the research problem, research questions 
and objectives, significance in the study and follow with the scope and 
limitation of the study. Lastly, this chapter delineates the structure of the 





This chapter furnishes a review of prior literature on the subject of networks 
and its implication on companies' performance. Explicitly, it offers insights 
into the subsequent subjects: social networks, social networks definition and 
measurement, determinants, CEO's networks, networks in Malaysia, the 
consequences of networks on companies' performance, with some critical 
review of related studies. This chapter is ended by reviewing on 
underpinned theories in which the hypotheses and analyses of this study. 
2.2 Social Networks 
The social network theory was initiated and prevailing in late I 980an which 
seek to explicate the value of a social network to facilitate the key market 
actors in acquiring the needed resources from accessed networks. In line 
with Katz et al. (2004), a social network is a common manner where a group 
of actors or nodes are linked through a set of social affiliations, linkages, or 
a particular form of ties. The word "network" is commonly referred to the 
arrangement of ties between the actors within a social structure (Granovetter, 
1985). Such theory, alternatively, synthesizes the conception of personal 
relationships into business exchange equation. In social network studies, an 
entity that their network being examined is addressed as "ego", whereas the 
entity that links with the ego is addressed "alter". Thus, the social network is 
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also generally perceived as a means in favour of assunng importance 
resources from alters. The social network is principally typified as personal 
links and relations in social composition (Granovetter, 2005). The ties such 
as friendship, educational background, or social activities are imperative in 
the social network as it constitutes a base to uphold and nurture the 
networks (Cohen et al., 20 I 0). Members in similar network interact with 
each other to follow the same norms of such network they willingly access. 
2.2.1 Social Networks Definition and Measurement 
Business transactions and activities are intimately attached to relationship 
networks of interpersonal connection. In our common ideas, the definition 
of "networks" or "connectedness" is fairly complex and subject to several 
interpretations. In basic, a network is composed of a set of actors in 
conjunction with a collection of ties of the specific form that connect each 
other (Katz et al., 2004). In social networks studies, actors are frequently 
referred to persons or groups of entities and the ties intersect via shared 
structures to outline the conduits that directly or indirectly connect the 
actors in the networks. The manner of network ties interlinked forms a 
particular arrangement, and actors held certain positions m this network. 
However, to quantify and measure such sociology conceptions in empirical 
research entails certain specific definitions. Accordingly, it is observed that 
different studies use diverse methods in their study to measure the social ties. 
As general rule, the majority of scholars often proxy the connectedness via 
merely computing the board seats or interlocks (Ferris et al., 2003). 
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Nevertheless, such manner disregards the characteristic of social 
connections. However, the network transmutations in fact could encompass 
long-contacting wave effects across the intact directorship network by 
means of both prior and existing connections. Instinctively, network 
transmutations of directors or companies with greater connectedness 
networks prompt outsized, far-arriving spread effects. It makes such 
complicated network quality conception be capable of empirically invented 
as a random connection across the board's network, as the stable probability 
distribution among actors (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). 
A number of studies that assume more advanced approaches, however, are 
inclined to crack down on simply active relationships in interlocking 
directorship networks (Larcker et al., 2013). However, this method possibly 
ignores valuable information founded in: the sizeable time-series mutation 
in such network, prior connections, and the characteristics of directors. 
Similarly, Feyen (2014) adopts two diverse viewpoints to compute the time 
variation of companies network quality rooted in the random walk approach: 
the level to which the companies: is better-connected to other boardrooms 
via directorship interlocking or 2) has better-connectedness directors on 
board, employing every access network information. However, Horton, 
Yuval and George (2012) claim the interlocking only focus on existing ties 
of independent directors. This is a common gap in the interlocking studies. 
In the study of Zajac, Edward, and Westphal (1996), a clear social network 
measures were developed using the demographic likeness among CEOs and 
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directors that rooted in career background, age, educational likeness, and 
interior/exterior likeness and establish that highly similarity among the CEO 
with the boards give rise to greater CEO pay. Likewise, Fracassi and Tate 
(2012) also follow the similar measures to define the cumulative direct ties 
of directors via the course of: current or prior employment, education 
background and other activities ties. Thus, this study follow the gap of 
interlocking studies to adopt the inclusive measures in the study of Fracassi 
and Tate (2012) that focus on the wider relation ties of CEO and directors to 
examine the implication of personal networking on companies' value. 
2.2.2 The Determinants of Social Networks 
Several studies have initiated to examine the predictor factors of social 
networks. Among of it, Feyen (2014) established that board size is one of 
the factors. Explicitly, the large size of boards inclined to have better 
connected CEOs given that larger board constitute a platform permit 
constitution for more richness linkages and beneficial interconnects among 
top executives with external directors. These connections, in tum, form a 
great amount of weak ties that provide CEO and directors an access to the 
diverse set of information and also expose them to business relationships 
essential to the company. Brown et al. (2012) and Subrahrnanyarn (2008) 
also asserts larger boards are more entrenched and thus apt to seek for fitting 
CEOs equipped with same attribute sitting in the board for a long duration . 
On the other hand, the tenure of CEO served in the companies also one the 
determinants of social networks (John, Nandu, & Schloetzer, 20 I 0). Social 
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network theory asserts that managers would develop a forceful base of 
social influence power across time. As days go by, incumbent CEOs began 
to accumulate larger connection ties and established influencing headship 
capacity in office (Nguyen-Dang, 2012). The value of the network enhanced 
with the amount of board engaged across career lifetime. Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985) also observe that CEOs with short occupancy are prone to 
be terminated due to considered lack of calibre than long-incumbent CEOs. 
Also, owing to the possible strength of CEO duality as the governance 
mechanism, its effects have been the concern of sizeable empirical studies. 
The power is the capability of a person to bypass opposition in arriving an 
intended result or motive (Adams et al., 2005). The status of CEO duality 
will offer unfettered power to the CEO. In organizational perspective, the 
capability to control the companies and selections of decisions also the 
outcomes is the base of networking power to influence others. 
Some studies observed a negative relationship between social networks and 
independence of board assessed in forms of external directors' proposition 
(Fracassi & Tate, 20 I 2). Such result is corresponding to the function of the 
independence directors in agency theory to oversight manager actions. Even 
the results are not consistent; however, independent directors are a critical 
element in governance practice. Following such argument, an independence 
voice prevents exist of unfettered power in the board. 
However, there is a gap of these prior studies using the corporate 
governance measures to specifically study and identify in which situation 
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the boards will judge it is crucial to have a better-connectedness CEO, 
particularly in emerging economic context. Hence, this study utilizes these 
measures to initiate the CEO's network study in Malaysia. 
2.3 CEO's Networks 
The function of CEO's networks has been examined in a range of finance 
and management perspectives, however the evidence of CEO's networks in 
accounting performance context are relatively limited. Among of it, the key 
findings such as Cohen et al. (2008) has documented that the networking of 
managers shape information advantages which bring about notably superior 
performance of connected companies compared with non-connected 
companies. In the later studies, Butler and Gurun (2012) exhibit that the 
CEOs as well promoted from the networking ties with other directors in the 
way of gaining higher paid. Cai and Sevilir (2012) scrutinize the board 
networking between the companies and acquirer companies, indicating that 
the social networking enhance information flow in the companies, and thus 
deliver value to the acquirers in terms of lower premiums and superior profit 
creation. Engelberg et al. (2012) observe the personal ties with bankers 
diminish the cost of finances and establish the significant result. Also, 
Engelberg et al. (2012) further assert that CEO social networking is valuable 
assets to the companies for the reason that it enhances the abilities of CEOs' 
to access key resources and transfer of the best practices from the networks. 
Recently, interpersonal managerial relationships have progressively turned 
into a key element of innovation (Gao, Xu & Yang, 2008). Consistent with 
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social network theory, there is a linkage derived from managerial relations 
forming social capital and thus influencing the company's performance. 
Managerial relations are referred to interpersonal ties of executives such as 
CEO with external parties. Explicitly, the interpersonal connection is act as 
a key source in support of knowledge exchange and information flows for 
innovation literature (Katz et al., 2004). 
Scores of studies also established that managerial relations shape significant 
consequences on companies' strategies and deemed as the driver of 
innovation (Gao et al., 2008). Social networks are imperative to assist 
companies to obtain needed resources and key information which drive the 
companies to stick to innovative stream on the continuous basis and to 
launch new offerings and attain desired performance. Managerial relations 
are particularly prevailing in emerging nations, given that the 'institutional 
voids' compel top executives to hinge on personal connections to obtain 
social support in replace of institutional support. Prior researches have 
indicated that managerial relations result in improved performance of 
companies in emerging economies (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). 
Plickert et al. (2007) asserted that social capital eases the know-how 
acquisition and development via impinging on conditions needed for value 
creation by means of the transfer and amalgamation of intellectual 
knowledge. Given the acquisitions of intellectual know-how are principally 
involve social process; a social network viewpoint regards such managerial 
relations are essential to perform as a channel of knowledge transfer. Given 
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the technologies progressively intricate, and implied knowledge rs 
exchangeable only via the course of massive interpersonal interflows, direct 
relations among organizational executives are critical for effectual learning. 
Appear as the key executive personnel, CEOs would exert a decisive 
function in knowledge transfer (Gao, Xu & Yang, 2008; and Li, 2005). 
Accordingly, managerial relations may assist in gaining new knowledge 
enhance companies' competitive position against the competitor. In 
emerging economies context, the connections among people perhaps more 
important given that it furnish access to reliable information, as relations are 
developed from a social framework of duty and trust, such information rs 
considered dependable if compared to information from other sources. 
2.4 Social Networks and Company Performance 
Prior evidence has been established how the constructed connections 
between the personal network and business activities are shaping company's 
performance (Adams et al., 2005; and Cohen, Frazzini & Malley, 2008). 
Recently, the social network has been employed in dyadic network studies 
as the dependent variable of company's performance (Adams et al., 2005). 
According to Adams et al. (2005), the economic concerns as addressed by 
social networks furnish new performance measures in relation to business 
expectations. This implies a relationship among the strength of personal 
connection in a network have an effect on the business activities and the 
company's performance. The idea of network capability shaping the 
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consequence of business activities is defined by Hochberg et al. (2007) as a 
particular attribute of companies and viewed in two constructs that is task 
implementation and criterions. The outcomes of the comparable study also 
reveal how the network capability directly connected with the market 
context and entire performance of company (Cohen et al. 20 IO ;  Hochberg et 
al., 2007; Granovetter, 2005; Plickert et al., 2007; and Shivaram et al., 2003). 
The dyadic attribute of social network where the perspectives of actor are 
varying thus signifies a challenge for academics in searching a quantifiable 
manner via simple analytical research to study actor's constructs. Cohen et 
al. (20 I 0) describe the effect of networks on company performance as "the 
observed financial outcome of the collective acting network parties, in 
relation to the expectations in network". 
Present evidence as regards the value consequences of social networks is 
diverse or mixed, conditional on the direction of study. Such phenomenon is 
not unforeseen given the influence of interpersonal networks on a company 
is vague. On the one hand, better connectedness directors and companies 
occupied a favourable position and gain the superiors access to promptly 
information flow, knowledge exchange, best practice transfer, or social 
support which offer them a privilege to exploit new opportunities, handle 
threats, enhance internal process, and enforce contracting in continuous base 
(Katz et al., 2004). Accordingly, network connections come into view 
adding value to the companies via smoothing the progress of information 
flow in several cases like: merger and acquisition (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Fang 
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et al., 2012), funding investment (Cohen et al., 2008), expert comments 
(Shivaram et al., 2003), and commercial investment (Hochberg et al., 2007). 
Whereas the foregoing advantages have been highlighted, some studies have 
recognized problems with networking in the board. For example, network 
connections also seem to undermine corporate governance, causing about 
manipulations in director nomination (Fracassi & Tate, 2012), CEO 
turnover results (John et al, 2010), and company investment (Hochberg et 
al., 2007). As well, numerous latest researches assert that network relations 
via interlocking bring about self-beneficial behaviour in term of higher 
compensation (Brown et al., 2012; and Hwang & Kim, 2009). 
Connected boards also might bring about the value-destroying business 
behaviours. For instance, the backdating of stock options is more 
widespread in companies with connected boards (Feyen, 2014). Equally, 
shared identical information sometimes also cause companies repeating 
faults in operating practices and strategic judgments (Hwang & Kim, 2009), 
or duplicating practices that is notoriety, like earnings management (Bums 
& Kedia, 2006). Also, the networks have weakened the corporate 
governance (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). Brown et al. (2012) also observe that 
CEO compensation was likely to be greater and CEO turnover to be seldom 
as the boards are "reciprocally connected". Moreover, companies may 
involve in cartel conduct, collaborating on pricing and decreasing rivalry 
pressure which inducing considerable legitimate threats can harshly damage 
the companies' value once revealed (Granovetter, 2005). 
26 
One more concern of social networking that emerges is directors engaged in 
large amounts of boardrooms. Directors who hold too many directorships 
perhaps unproductive owing to excessive pressure and time constraint a 
director be able to share to every company. Such phenomenon is signified as 
"busyness" (Ferris et al., 2003; and Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). Moreover, 
the greatly connected companies might seize excessively information. 
Except for the companies are capable to expeditiously process the received 
information, if not the companies indeed face the threat of overloaded (Fich 
& Shivdasani, 2006). Excessively information could interrupt a companies' 
capability to perform good judgments decisive to their future strategies and 
bring about inferior monitoring function (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
However, there is little studies focus on the consequence of key executive 
directors' networks such as CEOs on accounting performance of managed 
companies. Thus, it appears as a gap to be filled by this study. 
2.5 Critical Study of Related Studies 
In recent times, one strand of the literature surfaced that centred on studying 
if the social networks subsist and common within company boards. For 
instance, Davis, Fama and French (2000) examine the composition of the 
business leaders' network in the site of the US for the period of prior two 
decades. The study is focusing on the level of clustering, the extent of the 
ties linking any related directors, in addition to the constancy of the studied 
network. The findings discover a notable steadiness of the network across 
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the duration being studied, in spite of extensive transforms in the character 
of industrial banks and corporate governance regulations impinge on the 
boards. An elimination of the crucial market actors, for example, bankers 
from the network still not cause any change to the general features of such 
network. The results of their study as well examine a high extent of 
clustering and short path-spans in several measures of a "small world" event 
in the board of the company. The study establishes that networks come into 
view to be collective, and influence the entire level of the US companies. 
On the other hand, Cohen et al. (2008) employ the term of 'affiliation' 
networks. Such term refers to the networks differentiating among personal 
and boards among diverse forms of social parties, to ascertain is the small 
world phenomenon be real on the directorates. It denotes the situation on 
one occasion a group of board members could be examined that is 
corresponding tied with one another; in addition to pose the sound linkages 
to other clusters. Rooted in inputs from the site of European and the US, the 
study asserts that a "small world" consequence is outlined more owing to 
the choices from some instead of all members in the boards to assign modest 
to great amounts of interlocking individuals seat on the boardrooms, and not 
with the case where some interlockers looking to land on extraordinarily 
huge amount of boards (Cohen et al., 2008, and Canyon & Muldoon, 2006). 
On the other hands, their result reveals diverse results from the networks 
amongst firm-to-firm or director-to-director, by way of severe data in 
support of small world features. Such findings are corresponding to the far- 
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reaching strand of literature as regards the small world phenomenon that in 
substance verifies the subsistence of social networks among the directorates. 
Conyon and Muldoon (2006) examine outsized samples for the boards and 
members across the site of the US and European nations. The study employs 
a comparable method with Mather and Ramsay (2007) to extract 
hypothetically expected values via the course of later weigh against to the 
"small world" data with not the use of random graphs. From the observed 
findings, it establishes that although there is small world effect presents 
among the boards, but no obvious evidence could be traced in support of 
"ciubby" activities in the directorates. Explicitly, no any pattern of 
organized composition, no significant inclination of 'smallness' than be able 
predicted to observe coincidentally (Mather & Ramsay, 2007). In their 
findings, Canyon and Muldoon (2006) further concluded that the 'engaged' 
external directors can be seated in boardrooms with different directors, still 
has no any statistically obvious evidence of prevailing networks for CEOs. 
Later, the research of Larcker et al. (2013) examines the CEO and directors' 
networking in term of centrality, thus the corresponding substance of the 
CEO with the executive boards, cause a negative consequence on the 
performance of companies. Explicitly, such argument points that the greater 
influence and magnitude the CEO exerts toward the executive boards, the 
fewer chance of the companies concern with performance measures. 
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2.6 Underpinning Theories 
As pointed in the foregoing section, two underpinning theories are utilized 
in this study: social network theory and agency theory to assess the 
relationship between the networks of CEO and the companies' performance. 
This point is in line with the proposition of Popper (1959) to seek for the 
best fitting theory that better uphold itself in explaining observed facts in the 
course of competing with another theory. Notably, it is worth to note that 
these two theories attempt to explain the same fact and interaction of key 
variables from diverse perceptions. Explicitly, both of the mentioned 
theories are predicting a totally contradict pattern of relationship between 
the social connection and companies performance. Thus, it is interesting to 
examine which relationship predicted by the selected theories is established 
in the findings or both theories have their stand in the studied situation. 
2.6.1 Agency Theory 
Mainstream literature as examining the consequences of social networks, 
particularly board interlocking in conventional studies often has employed 
agency theory standpoints to examine how board interlocking effect 
interrelates with a variety of variables in corporate governance measures. 
Scores of studies under such convention attempt to validate that whether the 
exits of connected directors exerts a positive implication, or the emerged 




Berle and Means ( 1932) initially highlighted the setbacks that occur in the 
separation of management and ownership. To acquire capitals for the 
development of business activities, going public is regularly an ideal 
alternative owing to efficiency and cost-effective. This result in the listed 
companies has various ownerships. These shareholders are deemed as the 
principals to whom they engage in a contract relationship with executives 
act as their representative to operate the companies. Nevertheless, the 
assignment of authority may give the executive a chance in favour of 
opportunistic conduct, and result in principal-agent-problem . 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) construct on the ground of agency problem. 
The isolation among management and ownership shapes an information 
asymmetry across the principals and the agent. Initially, the owners have to 
observe the manager so as to assess the managerial effort has been exerted. 
The manager, in contrast, has access to the information without cost may 
not desire to share it. Absolutely monitoring the managers are impossible 
and the common owners in a distributed ownership are the force to tolerance 
to an unawareness incentive. It signifies the investment of fund and efforts 
to perform informed decisions is seldom beneficial. Thus, the shareholders 
not often acknowledge the best option and attempt of the CEO are regularly 
concealed. Sometimes it is implied a moral hazard and possibly will permit 
CEOs to execute option promotes themselves instead of the shareholders. 
Also, at time committing the contract with the CEO, the owners are 
incapable to perfectly assess the value that the CEO likely to be added to the 
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company. Likewise, after appointed, the shareholders are unlikely to 
perfectly monitor how good the CEO executes, and hence they have to 
evaluate the performance in certain manner. 
To sum with, the agency theory asserts that separation among management 
and ownership give rise to self-regarding behaviour in managers-controlled 
companies (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Given the proficient of companies- 
related knowledge and information access, the managers are presumed to 
pursue self-benefits above companies' owners. They possibly will seek for 
behaviours which promote themselves instead of the companies' owners. 
Thus, the manager appears to extort personal interests to the cost of owners. 
Even if agency theory is the foremost base of existing literature to explain 
the influence of CEO's networks on company performance, however, it 
often focus on the negative consequence of networks 
. . 
m various 
backgrounds such as compensation level (Bulter & Gurun, 2012; and 
Horton, Yuval & George, 2012), CEO turnover (Liu, 2010; and Kramarz & 
Thesmar, 2013) or corporate governance (Brown, Gao & Stathopoulos, 
2012). From it, only few studies employ the agency perspective focus on the 
consequence of CEO's networks with companies' performance but mainly 
in developed economies such as Adams et al. (2005), Fang et al. (2012), or 
Fracassi & Tate (2012) and the study ofKirchmaier & Stathopoulos (2008) 
is working paper. In Malaysia, the study of CEO's networks on listed 
companies' performance is lacking. Hence, there is a gap to depict more 
relevant and complete value ofCEO's networks in Malaysia. 
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Moreover, the whole outcomes of managerial networks, particularly the 
value adding facet are in fact neglected by the agency theory {Adams et al., 
2005; Cohen et al., 2010; and Fang et al., 2012). Nor Zalina (2016) further 
highlights a need of utilize alternative theoretical perspective to study the 
unique social context of emerging economies, instead of follow the agency 
theory perspective that is established by the strand of studies being 
performed in developed economies such as the US or the UK. An alternative 
premise, for instance the social networks theory, also clarifies the 
consequence of CEO's networks on companies' performance from another 
side (Cohen et al., 20 IO; Fang et al., 2012 and Hochberg et al., 2007). 
2.6.2 Social Network Theory 
Social network theory suggests that interpersonal connections adding value 
to actors such as persons, entities, or society via permitting them to access 
into the resources attached in the networks for their advantage (Shivaram et 
al., 2003). The top executives of companies are able to build social capital 
via several individuals, social, and business relations in their constituencies 
that be able to make use of for the sake of their companies. 
The origin of related researches concerning the consequence of social 
network on company governance could be traced back two decades or more, 
concern primarily into the phenomenon of board interlocking that is focused 
on the observable fact that CEOs land in one another directorates and thus 
construct a basic social network as the channel among of them. In line with 
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some standpoints, such interlocking connection is valuable seeing it leads 
to the distribution of innovations in the course of diverse practices and 
know-how are diffused among companies (Fang et al., 2012; Plickert et al., 
2007; Hochberg et al., 2007; and Zajac et al., 1996). A sizeable bulk of 
recent studies has further probed into the strategic effect of social ties. 
Often, these networks compnse individual and social relations with 
consumers, suppliers, politicians, authorities, society institutes. In this study, 
the focal point is drawn to the social capital that is formed by company's top 
executive via individual and social networks ties with directors in 
boardrooms. The social capital built via these networks connection act as 
channels for the conveyance of needed resources, information flow, and 
knowledge that can be capitalized to companies' benefits (Fang et al., 2012). 
The concept that "who you know" be capable of delivery advantages is 
renowned. Social network theory asserts that a relationship can be essential 
and beneficial. As such basic theory is evident, there are studies of scholars 
concerning why and how exactly a social connection should be regarded as 
valuable capital (Plickert et al., 2007; and Hochberg et al., 2007). Explicitly, 
Hochberg et al. (2007) assert that the advantages of social networks are 
anchored in three bases. Initially, social networks facilitate the exchange of 
information flow among persons thus be able to lessen transaction costs. For 
instance, alumni from same graduation year share career information 
(Cohen et al., 2010) . Next, social networks are capable of shape influence 
on others. For instance, an executive who is intimated with the boards is less 
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likely to be dismissed or obtain higher compensation than complete 
strangers (Larcker et al., 2013). Also, social supports and privilege are 
derived from the position in particular networks like professional title may 
symbolize reputation in the community (Guan, Su, Wu, & Yang, 2016). 
Based on social network theory, Katz et al. (2004) assert that resources are 
attached to the network of connections among individuals. Such embedded 
resources are seized as attributes of an individual contact. These resources 
are instinctive and frequently readily recognizable as prosperity, influence 
or position (Katz et al., 2004). On the other hand, the weak ties idea of 
Granovetter (2005) notably underlines the significant consequences of 
individuals can have as they function as information intermediary among 
different clusters. However, Coleman (1990) envisaged the value of social 
networks as concerning the closeness of connections among individuals. He 
views the value of social networks originates from shared forces where 
people cooperate to attain the same goal or common norm. Explicitly, 
Coleman ( 1990) also explains such unity as "closure". 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the literature review concerning social networks and 
its consequence on companies' performance. Some key facets and influence 
factors of variables are discussed. A review of related studies also 





This section delineates the design of research methods of this study. Next, 
Section 3.2 depicts a theoretical framework that forms a base to explicate, 
predict and capture the construct of interest. Corresponding hypotheses are 
developed within the framework and discussed in Section 3.3. While 
Section 3.4 is briefing to the details of research designs and approaches have 
been utilized. Subsequently, the definition of selected sample and related 
data collection techniques are underlined in Section 3.5 and 3.6. Section 3.7 
and 3.8 highlights the measurement of main variables. Lastly, Section 3.9 
explains the techniques of data analysis. Section 3 . 10  concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Research Framework 
This study is strived to assess the relationship between CEO's networks and 
companies' attributes and outcomes, explicitly, the determinants of key 
executive's networks; and also the consequence of CEO's networks on 
economic performance in terms of sales growth and the return of assets for 
Malaysian listed companies. To serve this purpose, the study is synthesizing 
the social network theory and agency theory in constructing two models that 
are succeeding to establish the relationship between the networks of CEO 
and companies performances. Two succeeding models are adapted from the 
study of Fracassi and Tate (2012) given that it is predicted such model 
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performed better in explaining two conjoined phenomena: firstly, the 
dynamic of the board and corporate governance structures as the key 
determinant in determining CEO's networks, and next, conceptualizing the 
consequence of CEO's social network on companies performance. 
As indicated by the figures in below, Figure 3 . 1  represents the phase in 
which corporate governance variables and corporate features form a 
circumstance to determine the appropriate connectedness level of CEO 
being selected. However, Figure 3.2 signifies the phase in which social 
networks of such CEO shape an influence on the performance of the 
managed company. Accordingly, the dependent variable of the first phase 
that is CEO's social networks in Figure I was then treated as one of the 
independent variables in the second phase that influencing the performance 
of company which indicated in Figure 2. To serve the concern of model 
parsimony, the study also treats the corporate governance and company 
specific measures in both stages as control variables. 
Independent Variables: 
1. CEO Tenure 
2. Size of Board Dependent Variables: 
Control Variables: 
1. Independent of Board 
2. CEO Duality 
3. Company Leverage 
4. Market to Book Ratio 
5. Total Assets 
CEO's Networks 
Figure 3 . 1 :  





1. CEO's Networks 
Control Variables: 
1. CEO Tenure 
2. Size of Board 
3.lndependentofBoard 
4. CEO Duality 
5. Company Leverage 
6. Market to Book Ratio 
7. Total Assets 
Dependent Variables: 
1. Sales Growth 
2. Return on Assets 
Figure 3.2: 
Phase 2 - Impact of CEO 's Networks on Company Performance 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
3.3.l Determinants of CEO's Networks 
How important are the networks of CEO to their nomination process and 
work performance? Sociology oriented theory such as social network 
hypothesis asserts that top executives often land their careers by means of 
friends and relation ties in preference to via the course of formal career 
market (Granovetter, 2005). The later studies established the concept that is 
addressed as weak ties which fairly imperative in reaching to the valued and 
appropriate career positions even more often than strong ties, and a job 
pairing process from weak ties manner is better than public market platform 
(Adams et al., 2005; Allgood & Farrell, 2003; and Granovetter, 2005). 
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In relation to CEO networks, it is expected weak ties of executives has been 
cumulated thus far is much greater if the incumbent CEO being served 
longer in the office. Such viewpoint is derived from the suggestion of social 
network theory asserts that CEOs would establish a powerful influencing 
base across time. Yermack (1996) propose that a new CEO deal with 
considerable challenges at the time taking office. They are called to adapt to 
their new positions and promptly develop sound relationships with the 
members of their executives' teams, companies' directors and forceful 
external stakeholders. When the time goes byes, the entrenched CEOs have 
progressively exhibit their leadership power and set up their networking 
strength, the challenges were thus be sharply diminished. Comparable 
evidence can be observed from the study of John et al. (2010) that 
documented CEOs with short tenure are be inclined to be terminated as 
compared to CEOs with long tenure. Hence, it is predicted that the longer 
tenure a CEO has entrenched to the company, the stronger is the networking 
base has been developed by CEO: 
Hypothesis 1: CEO with longer tenure develop stronger networking base. 
Also, it is predicted that large size of boards inclined to have better 
connected CEOs given that larger board constitute a platform permit 
constitution for more richness linkages and beneficial interconnects among 
top executives with directors (Gao et al., 2008; and Fan et al., 2007). Davis 
et al. (2000) also asserts that larger boards are more entrenched and thus be 
apt to seek for fitting CEOs that equipped with the same characteristic 
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sitting in their board for long duration (Brickley, Coles & Linck, 1999). The 
corporate governance literature commonly presumes that larger companies 
often complicated in nature and hence more likely seek to have skilled and 
better connected executives serve in the chair (Allgood & Farrell, 2003). 
Sound connectedness such as interlocks would matter more for large 
companies that demanding value adding from fine-constituted resources in 
term of strong networking to offer company protection in response to 
externalities risks (Harford & Li, 2007). If a well-connectedness person has 
greater access and attaches to other well-connected individuals, this study 
expect to see CEO on the large and better-connected boards is also a well­ 
connected candidate. Hence, it is reasonable to hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: The companies with large board size hire better-connected 
CEO. 
3.3.2 CEO's Networks and Performance of Company 
This study subsequently scrutinizes whether the CEO's networks discussed 
in the earlier section is endorsed with a linkage among managerial 
networking and growth in operating performance of company managed. As 
depicted in the foregoing discussion, the network of better connectedness 
executive enable access to valuable information base and facilitates smooth 
exchange of know-how as well as best practices among tied CEO and 
external entities, which sequentially allows the company dynamically to 
seek latent opportunities (Gao et al., 2008; and Hochberg et al., 2007). 
Seeking latent opportunities will furnish CEO the prospect to raise the 
company by either launching new products in the course of product 
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innovation or acqumng a competitive advantage in delivering present 
offerings via process improvement. Such enhanced novelty process will 
make possible new opportunities available to be exploited by companies, 
and a following sustainable growing of the companies' return (Cohen et al., 
2008). Into the bargain, the network of a well connected CEO also enables 
assess to 'new doors' and promote sales. Such phenomenon has been 
established in the previous studies that the networks of directors, even if not 
the CEO shape an effect on the sales of companies that offer services to the 
government (Fan et al., 2007). Such as, Gui (2006) and Fan et al. (2007) 
have point up the way of political-tied directors has capitalized on their 
network to obtain contracts. 
Economic activities of companies are innately entrenched in connections of 
interpersonal ties (Granovetter, 2005). Social network theory suggests that a 
sound interpersonal connection offer value-adding to key actors in such 
network includes individuals, companies, or societies by enabling them to 
reach to key resources attached in such affiliations to pursue their advantage 
(Cohen et al., 20 I 0). The top executives of a company such as CEO can 
assemble better-built social capital that comprises the diverse set of 
individual, social, and business ties with their communities formally or 
informally that be capable of serve to the interest of their companies. These 
weak ties consist of individual and social connections among key executive 
and consumers, suppliers, rivals, politician and bureaucratic constituencies, 
and society entities (Baiman & Rajan, 2002; Gui, 2006; Granovetter, 2005). 
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Scores of studies have established that managerial connections of key 
executive such as CEO shape decisive impacts on companies' strategies and 
can be a root of innovation (Gao et al., 2008; and Hochberg et al., 2007). 
These relationships are critical in assist companies attain to key exterior 
resources and information base which allow the company of better 
connected executive to be persistently inventive and launch innovative 
offering to achieve outstanding performance. Such phenomenon is 
prevailing to the technology-oriented industry as technologies turn into 
more complicated, and transfer of implicit knowledge is only feasible in the 
course of closely interpersonal communications, thus direct relations among 
executive members are essential in support of effectual learning process 
(Gao et al., 2008). This study supposes that the network of executives exert 
key mediating function in knowledge transfer and sharing that mapping 
across CEO' s managerial connections and company performance. 
In developing economies particularly Asian nations that embedded with 
relation-oriented structure, the value of social networks m executing 
transaction exchanges is further apparent owing to the significant extents of 
market imperfections, the existence of mechanism deficiencies, and the 
influence of local government act as the foremost economic player (Gomez 
& Jomo, 1997). Accordingly, top executives of companies in developing 
economies keenly build and expand networking ties with powerful 
politicians, bureaucratic representatives, and society figures to assure 
superior access and ease the smooth transfer of resources, know-how, or 
information in support of the activities performance for managed companies 
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(Gao et al., 2008; and Fan et al., 2007). Numerous studies in the fields of 
strategic management were employing data from developing economies 
have observed that a networking attached with government officers in 
support of company activities bring about enhanced performance (Gao et al., 
2008; and Li et al., 2005). 
Gomez and Jomo (1997) observe that social capital in term of networking 
relations entrenched with local institutional or dispersed society structures 
' 
impacts company performance. This is somewhat owing to the networks 
promote the transfer of social support, tacit knowledge and information that 
assists lessening involved transitions costs, in addition, to act as essential 
input for the operating activities (Gao et al., 2008; and Granovetter, 2005). 
Gao et al. (2008) also assessed the 'helpful' value to a company of its 
workers' networking relationship. Rooted in the hypothesis that the CEO 
will act in the same manner in promoting the interests of companies, this 
study thus expected that: 
Hypothesis 3: The networks of CEO are positively significant related with 
the companies' sales growth. 
One strand of proper-established perspective, which rooted in agency theory, 
underlines about a negative relationship between the networking on boardroom 
and company performance. Such viewpoint is derived from the hypothesis 
assumed that rational directors make use of the intrinsic information asymmetry 
seek to maximize their individual utility at the cost of owners and investors' 
interest. Across these decades, a considerable literature has been established 
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that delineates the consequence of board's networking undercut the best 
practices of companies' governance strength. Larcker et al. (2013), for 
instance, had observed that the compensation of CEOs who positioned in 
interlocked boardroom typically is higher as compared to those CEOs did 
not serve on interlocked boards. His findings also documented significant 
extents of interlocking in the sample encompass the outsized US companies 
where the proposition of interlocked companies ranges from one-fifth of the 
entire sample conditional on the circumscription of interlocking. 
Zajac, Edward and Westphal (1996), similarly focus on UK panel, reveal 
that interconnecting directorships among boardrooms be inclined to 
heighten compensation level and lessen the turnover rate of existing CEO. 
Accordingly, they explain this trend as a result of entrenchment. Their study, 
though, was unable to verify a significant relationship among interlocking 
networks of directors and companies performance. The later study of Brown, 
Gao, and Stathopoulos (2012) also exhibit the overwhelming managerial 
power lead to high compensation of CEOs. 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006), on the other hand, employing a diverse set of 
networking measures, explicitly the number of boards served by external 
directors, examined that 'boards busyness' are linked to poor corporate 
governance and the weak relationship between CEO's rotation with 
company performance. Particularly, the evidence suggests little variations in 
respect of the CEO turnover rate among busy and insider controlled 
boardrooms. The study also indicates a negative and considerable 
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connection between accounting performance of the company with the 
subsistence of busy external directors. 
Likewise, Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) observe that if the CEO with 
other board directors located in the similar social networks, poor performing 
CEOs are rarely to be dismissed. In case, however, such CEOs are expelling 
from existing post, later they are be likely offered another good job. 
Nevertheless, there is both qualitative and experiential data that indicates 
these fact indeed common issues among boards. Granovetter (2005) assert 
that this form of social networking connections which were built among 
diverse boards will bring about "largely significant extents of social unity", 
and similar to the case of strong cluster status that offers social security and 
patron, which lets CEOs to pursue their post at the expense of investors. 
According to such steam literature, it is reasonable to hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: The networks of CEO are negatively significant related with 
return on assets. 
3.4 Research Design 
In line with the motive seeks to shed light towards the relationship among 
the networks of CEO, company decision making process and performance, 
the design of quantitative analysis is considered appropriate meant for the 
objective and intentions of this study. The judgment to employ quantitative 
analysis design as the domain approach to assess the model of social 
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networks performance is following the research method of prior studies in 
support of the subsequent rationales: 
I .  The requisite to generate research findings by way of a high extent of 
operational trustworthiness has supported the alternative to employ a 
quantitative analysis design. 
2. The financial data obtained from the sample size of I 00 listed companies 
in Bursa Malaysia affirmed the choice to employ the quantitative approach 
to analyse the data in a meaningful way. 
3. The motive seeks to devote credit the research of social networks, 
lengthening the existing strand of literature. 
3.5 Sampling 
To examine the research hypothesizes empirically, top I 00 non-financial 
companies listed in Bursa Malaysia which ranked by market capitalization 
in the main market as at 3 1  December 2016 are selected as sample of this 
study. Such sampling approach is a simulation of Bliss and Gui's study 
(2012). Often, large companies are regarded as occupied greater part of 
resources and prospects in the market (Bliss & Gui, 2012). Also, there is the 
legal obligation for large listed companies in the market ought to maintain 
good reporting practice to furnish transparent information to public and 
foreseeable parties (Bums & Kedia, 2006; and Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
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Noteworthy, this study only uses one-year data that is the year 2016 since 
the main variable of CEO's networks is collective confines the study to 
single-year cross-sectional examination. But, it is expected that one year 
study only slightly impinges on the results, given the changes of social 
networks across years are relatively little; hence employing panel data likely 
to be a restricted value seeing that there is no considerable time-series 
difference in this key variable. 
Rooted in a wide-ranging sample of Malaysian listed companies in 2016, 
this study gathered information as regard the networks, corporate 
governance and performance via the source of DataStream database and 
manually-collected annual report of listed companies which can be 
obtainable in Bursa Malaysia website and companies official portal. In the 
light of convention practice in corporate governance studies, this study 
follows the same rule and eliminates financial companies in the selected 
sample. Accordingly, the final sample of top I 00 non-financial companies 
selected with a cumulative market capitalization worth of RM I,  150 billion. 
The data of CEO's networks is acquired from the Relationship Science 
database provided by McGraw-Hill, annual reports and executive profile in 
Bloomberg database. These databases enclose all-inclusive biographic 
information of key executives and directors of listed companies over the 
world. The biographical information is taking account of demographic 
characteristics (such as age, gender, nationality), career background (such as 
existing or previous engagements, directorships and employment position), 
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educational information (such as the school, university, course, and 
graduation year), and other activities, for instance membership of 
foundation, club, chamber, society associations, and charities. The datasets 
also make available the relational ties among CEOs and directors. The ties 
are developed if two persons were currently or once engaged in the same 
company, held active joint memberships in the nonprofessional bodies (for 
instance foundations, chambers, government entities), or alumni ties from 
attended to the same school before with the interval of graduation year not 
more than two years. 
From Thomson Financial DataStream and annual reports, this study 
gathered data on CEO tenure, board size, number independence of directors, 
and CEO duality. In aside, the study also retrieved financial data from same 
sources, gathering data regarding financial performance, debt leverage, total 
assets, and market to book ratios. This study uses accounting results, rather 
than market returns given that financial performance is a lesser amount of 
noisy and reflect more about the result of CEO exertion even it is admitted 
that such figures possibly conditional on purposeful manipulation (Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2007). This study evaluates companies' performance in terms of 
sales growth (SG) (Fang et al., 2012; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Liu, 2010; and 
Yaniv & Patatoukas, 2014) and return on assets (ROA) (Fracassi & Tate, 
2012; Kirchamaier & Stathopoulos, 2008; and Nam & An, 2017). 
Overall, the sample of study is founded on Malaysia data, which in the 
forms of corporate governance and board measures are somewhat identical 
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to the US. Both nations similarly endorse a unitary board structure, and both 
nations necessitate the nomination committee to exclusively only include 
external non-executive directors. The difference in the standards is it is an 
ordinary rule in the US to comprise a joint Chairman and CEO position, 
while in Malaysia such two posts are usually separate. Thus, it is interesting 
to observe the results of the study in these two different sites. 
3.6 Data Collection Procedures 
Secondary data is employed in the study to perform a cross-sectional 
analysis. To serve this objective, the data related to .all variables are 
gathered from Bursa Malaysia founded on Bursa main market as discussed 
in foregoing sampling section. Accordingly, this study only focuses to top 
I 00 companies listed in Bursa Malaysia main market at 31 December 2016. 
The data collection sequences are as below: 
I) Obtain the list oftop 100 companies in the Bursa Malaysia main market; 
2) Remove 1 8  companies listed under finance category; 
3) Remove I company without complete data; 
4) Replace the removal companies with other top-ranking non-financial 
companies according to market capitalization. 
Financial companies are labelled as the field of the special sector. A 
specialize and highly regulated industry such as financial sector innately 
involve enormous cash flow in operating activities and different accounting 
measurement method as well as disclosure regulation which more likely 








information about the board information and relevant data which treated as 
the input of key variables in this study. With the purpose of ensuring the 
reliability of empirical results and incomplete information, the study is 
rejecting the company from the sample. Following all stipulated criterions, 
there were remaining 81 listed companies. This study then includes other 
non-financial companies ranked by their market capitalization as at 31 
December 2016. At last, these I 00 companies were treated as a final sample. 
Specifically, the relevant data in relation to CEO's networks is collected 
from the Relationship Science database, executive profile in Bloomberg 
database and annual reports. These databases offer reliable and explicit 
biographic information regarding top executives and directors of listed 
companies in worldwide. The study considers and assembles the inclusive 
information of CEOs and directors in terms of: the demographic traits (for 
instance age and gender), career background (for instance current or prior 
engagements, directorships and position), educational information (for 
example the university, bachelor, and graduation year), and other activities 
(for instance the active key membership of club, foundation, chamber, 
society associations, or charities). 
From the collected data, the ties between CEOs and directors are identified 
accordingly if two persons were engaged in current or previous employment 
with the same external company, held active joint memberships in the 
nonprofessional bodies, or educational ties from same alumni the CEOs and 
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directors together attended with at any time, excluding the interval of 
graduation year more than two years 
Latest studies that utilize this dataset be inclined to emphasise one or all of 
these network ties (Cohen et al., 2008; Engelberg et al., 2012; and Fracassi 
& Tate, 2012). This study follows the suggestion of Fracassi and Tate (2012) 
to take account of all forms of these network ties. 
Particularly, this study recognizes a career engagement ties are developed if 
two persons have currently or previously employed in the same external 
company. Other activity ties are determined if two persons held joint 
membership of minimum one nonprofessional body that director and CEO 
together actively engaged with for instance foundations, chambers, or 
government entities. To ensure they held active positions in bodies, this 
study identifies a qualified other activity tie to be the situation where a 
person was in excess of a normal member and in the place held a key 
position of the non-professional bodies. Specifically, such key position 
could be either a "President," "Trustee," or "Board Member." But, there is 
exclusion for the membership of club society in which just a membership 
also judged to be qualified (Fracassi, 2012). The educational tie between 
two persons are connected if they shared the same alumni of minimum one 
schools that director and CEO together attended with at any time, excluding 
the interval of graduation year more than two years. The interval limitation 
of graduation year in educational ties is to ensure the possibility that the 
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persons m fact connected owing to the shared educational background 
(Fracassi & Tate, 2012). 
3.7 Measurement of the Model and Variables 
This section delineates the measurement of key variables to be testified in 
empirical model, which is including dependent variables, independent 
variables as well as control variables. As highlighted, this study seeks to 
examine the relationship between companies' characteristics CEO's and 
networks. In line with research objectives of this study, two successive 
phase of models were employed in assessing two different but the conjoined 
phenomenon which is: firstly, the dynamic of the board and corporate 
governance structures as determinants that influence the networks of CEO; 
and conceptualizing the consequence of CEO's networks on companies 
performance. Accordingly, there are two sets of dependent variables in two 
different successive stages of models and explicitly, it is worth to highlight 
that the dependent variables in the primary phase of models are treated as 
part of independent variables in the models of the second phase. The further 
information on variables was addressed in below. 
3.7.1 Phase 1 Model: Determinants ofCEO's Networks 
To facilitate analysis the determinants in CEO's networks, a linear ordinary 
least square (OLS) regressions are employed to examine the relationship 
between CEO networks and corresponding corporate governance proxies. 
Accordingly, the dependent variable in this phase is CEO's networks. The 
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independent variables have mainly comprised a set of corporate governance 
measures; in addition to a range of company-specific control variables 
measures, such as, growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio), company 
leverage, and company size (total assets) to safeguard model parsimony. It 
is asserts that companies with particular attributes seek to find CEOs with 
specific unique qualities that best serve their needs, such as better 
connectedness. Thus, a model in the first phase of this study is adapted from 
the prior study of Fracassi and Tate (2012) as below: 
LOGNW = flo + Jl1TENURE + Jl2SOB + flJIOB+ fl•DUALITY+ 
JlsLEVERAGE+ Jl6MTB+ Jl1LOGASSET,+ f; 
Where; 
(1) 
LOGNW = Natural logarithm of CEO's networks, which is the total 
connection from current engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other 
activity ties, and education tie. For example, the networks of CEO for 
company A consist of the total ties derived from: i) current engagement tie 
from existing employment between CEO and directors in external company, 
ii) previous engagement tie from prior employment between CEO and 
directors in external company, iii) other activities tie such as active joint 
membership between CEO and directors in nonprofessional entities, and iv) 
education tie from the same alumni between CEO and directors with 
interval of graduation year not more than two years. 
TENURE= Number of years CEO held the position in particular company. 
SOB= Size of the board, which is the number of the directors on the board. 
IOB = Number of independent director serve on the board. 
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DUALITY= CEO or chairman duality, I if CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise. 
LEVERAGE = Leverage ratio, which is long-term debt plus short-term 
debts divided by total equity. 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio, which is market capitalization divided by 
company book value. 
LOGASSET = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
3.7.2 Phase 2 Model: CEO's Networks and Performance of Company 
i. Sales Growth 
In accordance to two competing theories underpinned in this study, social 
network theory suggests a positive relationship among CEO connectedness 
and growth of earnings performance (Fang, et al., 2012; Liu, 20 I 0, and 
Shivaram et al., 2003); however, agency theory proposes a negative 
relationship among CEO connectedness and accounting performance 
(Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Kirchmaier & Stathopoulos, 2008; and Nam & An, 
2017). At here, CEO's networking in the first model is assumed as an 
independent variable in measuring the consequence of CEO connectedness 
to performance. To examine the consequence of CEO's networking on 
company performance explicitly, this study utilizes two set of performance 
measures, sales growth and return on asset. To begin with, this study firstly 
evaluates the consequence of CEO connectedness on sales growth, hinging 
on linear OLS regression model as below: 
LOGSG = flo + J}1LOGNW + J}2TENURE + f}JSOB + fldOB+ 




LOGSG = Sale growth, which is current year sales minus last year sales, 
then divided by last year sales. 
LOGNW = Natural logarithm of CEO's networks, which is the total 
connection from current engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other 
activity ties, and education tie. For example, the networks of CEO for 
company A consist of the total ties derived from: i) current engagement tie 
from existing employment between CEO and directors in external company, 
ii) previous engagement tie from prior employment between CEO and 
directors in external company, iii) other activities tie such as active joint 
membership between CEO and directors in nonprofessional entities, and iv) 
education tie from the same alumni between CEO and directors with 
interval of graduation year not more than two years. 
TENURE = Number of years CEO held the position in particular company. 
SOB= Size of the board, which is the number of the directors on the board. 
IOB = Number of independent directors serve on the board. 
DUALITY= CEO or chairman duality, I if CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise. 
LEVERAGE = Leverage ratio, which is long-term debt and short-term 
debts to total equity. 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio, which is market capitalization to company 
book value. 
LOGASSET = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
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ii. Return on Assets 
In the next step of this phase, this study follows agency theory by conducts 
another test to justify the consequence of social networks on accounting 
performance that is the return on assets. Accordingly, the analysis is 
instigated via the initial model as below: 
ROA= !30+ l31LOGNW + l32TENURE + l3JSOB + l3dOB+ l3sDUALITY+ 
l36LEVERAGE+ l31MTB+ l3sLOGASSET; + £; (3) 
Where; 
ROA= Return on assets, which is net income to total assets. 
LOGNW = Natural logarithm of CEO's networks, which is the total 
connection from current engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other 
activity ties, and education tie. For example, the networks of CEO for 
company A consist of the total ties derived from: i) current engagement tie 
from existing employment between CEO and directors in external company, 
ii) previous engagement tie from prior employment between CEO and 
directors in external company, iii) other activities tie such as active joint 
membership between CEO and directors in nonprofessional entities, and iv) 
education tie from the same alumni between CEO and directors with 
interval of graduation year not more than two years. 
TENURE= Number of years CEO held the position in particular company. 
SOB = Size of the board, which is the number of the directors on the board. 
IOB = Number of independent directors serve on the board. 
DUALITY= CEO or chairman duality, I if CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise. 
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LEVERAGE = Leverage ratio, which rs long-term debt and short-term 
debts to total equity. 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio, which is market capitalization to company 
book value. 
LOG ASSET = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
iii. Robustness Check of Return on Assets Model 
But, the return on assets model is theoretically weak owing to a primary 
reason. It is suspected an endogeneity problem exists among accounting 
performance in term of return on assets and social networks that 
considerable to the extent unable be solved in this model. Particularly, if 
employing return on assets model, it implies this study simply consider the 
causality relationship where social networking measures influence the 
financial performance variables as the only real direction. 
Although this study hypothesizes that social networks drive financial 
performance such as return on assets, on the other hand, it also a proposition 
suggests that performance be capable to shape the power of networking. 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that CEOs tend to hold more external 
directorships as there is sound accounting performance of companies 
managed such as return on assets. 
Therefore, this study considers the results of Fich and Shivdasani (2006) to 
test such 'inverse' relationship in the further test. Accordingly, this study 
develops a new equations system and test a two-stage least square 
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regression in the arrangement as below to test the endogeneity. The first 
model is the corresponding with the model of CEO networking in phase 1 ,  
but a new independent variable is the return on assets to control this inverse 
correlation. In the second model, it is robustness model of return on assets 
with the fitted values of LOGNW to analysis the linkage between 
networking and performance, 
LOGNW = f}o+ f}1ROA + f}iTENURE + f}1SOB + f}dOB + f}sDUALITY 
+ f}6LEVERAGE + f}1MTB + f}sLOGASSET; + £; (4) 
ROA= f}o+ f}1LOGNWA + f}2LEVERAGE + f}1MTB + f}4LOGASSET;+ 
8 � 
Where; 
ROA= Return on assets, which is net income to total assets. 
LOGNW = Natural logarithm of CEO's networks, which rs the total 
connection from current engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other 
activity ties, and education tie. For example, the networks of CEO for 
company A consist of the total ties derived from: i) current engagement tie 
from existing employment between CEO and directors in external company, 
ii) previous engagement tie from prior employment between CEO and 
directors in external company, iii) other activities tie such as active joint 
membership between CEO and directors in nonprofessional entities, and iv) 
education tie from the same alumni between CEO and directors with 
interval of graduation year not more than two years. 
LOGNWA= Fitted values ofCEO's networks. 
TENURE = Number of years CEO held the position in particular company. 
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SOB= Size of the board, which is the number of directors on the board. 
108 = Number of independent directors serve on the board. 
DUALITY= CEO or chairman duality, I if CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise. 
LEVERAGE = Leverage ratio, which is long-term debt and short-term 
debts to total equity. 
MTB = Market-to-book ratio, which is market capitalization to company 
book value. 
LOGASSET = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
3.7.3 Dependent Variable 
As depicted in the foregoing section, there are three dependent variables 
employed in this study: CEO's networks, sales growth, and return on assets. 
LOGNW is a variable refers to CEO networks that comprise a collective one 
that measuring all direct ties the CEO has built across her lifetime. It 
calculates the direct connections developed by CEO, rather than the indirect 
connection that is the ties may develop by mean of another third director on 
same boardroom (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). This study follows the suggestion 
of Fracassi and Tate (2012) to take account all forms of current engagement 
tie, previous engagement tie, other activity ties, and education tie. 
To measure the characteristic of CEO's networks, this study collect 
individual and biographic information as regard with the CEO's networks 
from Relationship Science database, executive profile in Bloomberg 
database and annual reports. These databases furnish reliable and detail 
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information about top executives and directors of listed companies m 
worldwide. Accordingly, this study measures the CEO's networks from the 
all-ranging information concerning with the career background (such as 
current or prior engagements, directorships and position), other activities 
(such as the active key membership of club, foundation, chamber, or 
charities), and educational information (such as the university, bachelor, and 
graduation year). Through this gathered data, the ties of CEOs and directors 
are recognized accordingly if two persons were engaged as below. 
Firstly, the current engagement tie denotes the connection from existing 
employment of minimum one common company the director and CEO is 
externally engaged with (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). For instance, a current 
engagement tie is said exist if a CEO and director is concurrently serving in 
the same external boardroom or working in at least one external company. 
Next, the previous engagement tie denotes the connection from past 
employment of minimum one common company the director and CEO were 
externally engaged with (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). For instance, a previous 
engagement tie is said exist if a CEO and director is previously serving in 
the same external boardroom or working in at least one external company. 
Other activity ties signify that the connection from joint membership of 
minimum one nonprofessional bodies that director and CEO together 
actively engaged with such as the foundations, chambers, or government 
entities. To ensure they held active positions in bodies, this study identifies 
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a qualified other activity tie to be the situation where a person was in excess 
of a normal member and in the place held a key position of the non­ 
professional bodies. Specifically, such key position could be either a 
"President," "Trustee," or "Board Member." But, there is exclusion for the 
membership of club society in which just a membership also judged to be 
qualified (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). 
Education tie indicates that the connection from same alumni of minimum 
one schools that director and CEO together attended with at any time, 
excluding the interval of graduation year more than two years. The interval 
limitation of graduation year in educational ties is to ensure the possibility 
that the persons in fact connected owing to the shared educational 
background (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). 
To illustrate the measurement of CEO's network more clearly, it is proper to 
look at an example (further details please refer to Appendix 3 ), for instance, 
a CEO from company A who has 5 current engagement ties from existing 
employment of company in which director and CEO together externally 
engaging with, 2 prior engagement ties from past employment of external 
companies in which director and CEO engaged together, 4 other activity ties 
derived from joint memberships chamber and foundation with directors, and 
I education tie given the shared alumni status with directors. Hence, the 
networks of CEO for company A is computed by adding up all ties in above 
and it is I 2 connections in this case. To confine the outliner effect, this 
study uses natural logarithm value. 
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This measure is believed offer a more comprehensive indicator of networks 
as it covers not merely the interlocking however an added realistic measure 
of a CEO's ties that accumulated across the lifetime. Thus, it is assumed this 
inclusive variable provides a better-defined depiction ofCEO's networks. 
LOGSG is a logarithm value of company's net sales growth over the 
financial period. The formula of sale growth ratio is current year sales minus 
last year sales, then divided by last year sales. Sales growth ratio is a 
relative amount of percentage that evaluates sales performance of company 
via measuring the change in net sales value across two succeeding years. 
Ahsan Habib (2010) assert positive sales growth implies the boost up of 
company financial performance across years. The evidence of Y aniv and 
Patatoukas's (2014) study indicated that sales growth shape a positive 
influence on the overall profitability of the company. As acknowledged the 
size of sales growth, a company can relatively forecast the level of profit 
expected to realize in the end. In relation to Ahsan Habib's (2010) study 
give details the significance of sales growth indicates the expected outposts 
of company expansion in future. 
ROA is a ratio of annual earnings divided by total assets over financial 
period. The formula of return on asset (ROA) ratio is net income divided by 
total assets. Consistent with Fracassi and Tate (2011), ROA is an indicator 
of the general effectiveness of executive in yielding profits by means of 
accessible assets. Given ROA is the measure of company success for wealth 
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management, thus a positive value of the ROA reveals the efficiency of 
company's performance in utilizing the assets to make profits. 
3.7.4 Hypothesize Variables 
TENURE is referred to CEO tenure which measured via capture the span of 
years the CEO has held the existing position in the company. It is calculated 
the number of years of current employment. Social network theory argues 
that CEOs would form a powerful networking base across the period. 
However, recent literature suggests CEO tenure is related to company­ 
employee connection strength and in turn will influences company 
performance either positively or negatively (John et al., 20 I 0). 
SOB is referred to the number of board members serve on the company 
board. It is broadly identified that the size of the board is a decisive 
corporate governance mechanism and exerts a foremost function in 
company's management. In this context, board size and its consequence on 
company performance is very controversial matter in corporate governance 
but recent studies particularly resource dependence hypothesis suggest 
positively relationship of board size to the performance (Feyen, 2014). 
3.7.5 Control Variables 
Several control variables were employed in the study to ensure model 
parsimony include: independence of boards, duality, leverage, market-to­ 
book ratio (MTB) and total assets. 
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JOB is referred to a number of independent directors serve on the company 
board. In this study, it is dummy value where equal to 1 if CEO is chairman, 
O if otherwise. Initially, agency theory suggests that independent director as 
the key internal mechanism in ensure best governance practice (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002). However, some scholars also have documented a negative 
correlation between the total of external directors with company value and 
managerial performance. For instance, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and 
Adams and Ferreira (2003) respectively, observe a negative association 
between the size of the independence directors and company performance. 
DUALITY is referred to the circumstance which CEO at the same time held 
the chairman of the boardroom. The measure of CEO duality is particularly 
emphasized by the combined code as it symbolizes the possible issue of 
unfettered authority on decision-making and imbalanced power. 
Accordingly, this study measure duality employing a dummy variable that is 
one if two positions are divided, or zero if vice versa. Adams et al. (2005) 
suggest that CEOs duality results in excessive power to pursue their self 
benefits instead of shareholders interest. Thus, it is predicted to CEO duality 
negatively influence company performance. 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt owed divided by total equity held by 
the company. Bliss and Gui (2012) suggest the positive relationship between 
debt leverage and networking in term of political connection. However, high 
leverage level to certain extent signifies the company were subject to breach 
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- 
the debt covenant, thus increased monitoring requirement in term of risk 
premium was high, which cause debt cost increase and lower profitability. 
The evidence of the recent study indicates the negative relationship between 
debt leverage and company performance. Long-term debt is additional 
costly owing to transaction costs. Hence, it is expected to utilize high extent 
of debt cause negative effect on company profitability. 
MTB is the market to book ratio that computed by comparing the market 
value of companies to its book value. Often, MTB ratio is treated as a proxy 
of growth opportunities has been a regular indicator of company value. Prior 
studies argue that this ratio reveals the capability of management in 
generating sound operational performance and accounting outcomes (Fich 
& Shivdasani, 2006). Hence, it is predicted MTB ratio is positively related 
to company performance. 
LOGASSET is common variable regularly employed as the proxy of 
company size in corporate governance literature. This variable often 
represents by the natural logarithm of total assets. Accordingly, a large 
amount of this variable signifies the size of the company is high that is 
comparative (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). The company size is the total and 
diversity of operational capacity and resources a company occupied. Often, 
the large company own and need variety set of resources such as networking. 
As well, company size is presumed positively linked to the performance 
owing to implications of economies scale. 
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3.8 Research Variables 
Table 3.1 
Description of Dependent Variables. 
Variables Measurement Source 
LOGNW The total direct ties of CEO has built Relationship 
across lifetime, consist of: 
i) Current engagement tie, 
ii) Previous engagement tie, 
iii) Other activity tie, and 
iv) Education tie. 










directors in external company; Previous 
engagement tie is pnor employment 
between CEO and directors in external 
company; Other activities tie is active 
joint membership between CEO and 
directors in nonprofessional body; 
Education tie rs the same alumni 
between CEO and directors with 
interval of graduation year not more 
than two years. 
The natural logarithm value of net sales DataStream 
growth percentage, which rs: current 
year sales minus last year sales, then 
divided by last year sales. 
The percentage of return on asset, or net Data Stream 
income to total assets. 
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Table 3.2 
Description of Independent Variables. 
Variables Measurement Prediction Source 
LOGNW The total direct ties of CEO Positive 
has built across lifetime, or Negative 
consist of: 
i) Current engagement tie, 
ii) Previous engagement tie, 
iii) Other activity tie, and 
iv) Education tie. 
Current engagement tie ts 
existing employment between 









engagement tie ts prior 
employment between CEO 
and directors m external 
company; Other activities tie 
is active joint membership 




Education tie is the same 
alumni between CEO and 
directors with interval of 
grad nation year not more than 
two years. 
Number of years CEO held Positive 
the position m particular or Negative 
company. 







Variables Measurement Prediction Source 
IOB Number of independent Negative Annual 
directors serves in company's Reports 
board. 
DUALITY Dummy variable, I if the Negative Annual 
CEO is a board's chairman, 0 Reports 
otherwise. 
LEVERAGE The ratio of total debts to Negative DataStream. 
equity. 
MTB The ratio of company's Positive DataStream 
market capitalization to book or Negative 
value. 
LOGASSET Natural logarithm of total Positive DataStream 
assets. 
3.9 Data Analysis 
3.9.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis is the preliminary test to quantitatively depict the basic 
traits of sample data. It is a simple summary statistic that forms a base to 
virtually interpreting data pattern visibly and simplifies large numbers of 
variables' raw data in a sensible manner (Tofallis, 2008). The descriptive 
measures in this test include the range (minimum or maximum value), 
central tendency (mean), and variability (standard deviation) about every 
variable in the model. 
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3.9.2 Normality Assumption 
Normality assumption delineates a test to best guess whether the pattern of 
the sampling distribution for the mean of variables is in a normal 
distribution (Toby Mordkoff, 2016). With the purpose to identify how likely 
the best guess in the study perhaps to be wrong and to form a confidence 
interval on behalf of the certain value, it is relevant in multivariate analysis 
following the same procedure to predict the sampling distribution for the 
attribute of interest. Often, normality test is estimated the sampling 
distribution for the mean given the mean almost at all times constitute the 
attribute of interest. However, this test possibly is not always exact when the 
sample size is relatively small even it is the strong assumption. To serve the 
purpose of normality assumption, this study uses Shapiro-Francia test. 
3.9.3 Heteroskedasticity Test 
Heteroskedasticity has regularly emerged in cross-sectional regression 
analysis. An underlying cause of this situation is the conditional distribution 
of dependent variable has the diverse extent of variability to the different 
population. The subsistence of heteroskedasticity is a significant issue in the 
appliance of regression testing, as well as the variation analysis, as it can 
decline the significance of statistical resu Its by presuming the modelling 
errors are unrelated and homogeneous (Richard William, 2015). 
Accordingly, even the ordinary least squares measures are relatively fair in 
the existence of heteroskedasticity, still it is considered inefficient owing to 
the real variation are undervalued. In this study, Breush-Pagan/ Cook- 
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Weisberg Test and Ramsey RESET test are utilized to assess the 
heteroskedasticity via the chi-square value. 
3.9.4 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity is a statistical occurrence wherein subsists of a perfect or 
high extent of correlation among the hypothesize variables (Ranjit Kumar 
Paul, 2006). As an exact relationship emerges among the independent 
variables, it is the difficult to reach to the reliable estimation of coefficients 
for each variable respectively. It will result in incorrect conclusions about 
the relationship between the outcome variable and predictor variables. 
Multicollinearity issue intensifies the variances between the indicator 
estimates and thus gives rise to the statistical insignificance of each variable. 
To this, Pearson Correlation test and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test 
was employed to examine the multicollinearity issue. 
3.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter highlight the methodology of research, proposed hypothesizes 
and the process of sampling collection. Explicitly, it started by clarifies the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses development. At last, this chapter 
gives details the analysis technique to be employing in the study in assess 
the relationship among response and predictor variables. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, it started by demonstrating the descriptive statistics result, 
subsequently with the presentation of the regression results. It is followed 
by a discussion of the results, and most important the examination of 
whether predicted hypotheses are rejected or supported. Lastly, the 
robustness tests and two-stage regression results are also discussed in last. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of all variables are exhibited in the following table. 
r-r- 
Table 4. 1  
Summaries of Descriptive Statistics (N= 100). 
Variables Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
LOGNW 1.2589 0.9833 0 4.54 
LOGSG 0.1479 0.0126 -0. 1 170 0. 1761 
ROA 0.0726 0.1027 -0.1807 0.6032 
TENURE 8. I I 8.97 39 
SOB 9.06 2.0881 5 1 5  
JOB 4 . 1 3  1 . 1691  2  8  
DUALITY 0 . 1 1  0.3145 0 
LEVERAGE l . 1 37  1.5076 0.05 l 0.48 
MTB 4.004 8.4407 0.24 72.32 
LOGASSET 15 .5919  l.35 I 7 12.6228 18.7051 
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Notes: LOGNW is natural logarithm ofCEO's networks which is the total connection from 
current engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other activity ties, and education tie. 
Current engagement tie is existing employment between CEO and directors in the external 
company. Previous engagement tie is prior employment between CEO and directors in the 
external company. Other activities tie is active joint membership between CEO and 
directors in the nonprofessional body. Education tie is the same alumni of CEO and 
directors with interval of graduation year not more than two years; LOGSG is natural 
logarithm of sales growth current year sales minus last year sales, then divided by last year 
sales; ROA is net income to total assets; TENURE is the number of years CEO held the 
position in particular company: SOB is number of director in the board; JOB is number of 
independent directors serve on the board; Duality is the CEO or chairman duality, I if the 
CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise; LEVERAGE is ratio of long-term debt and short-term debts 
to total equity; MTB is market capitalization to company book value market to book ratio; 
LOGASSET is natural logarithm of total assets. 
The I 00 companies in the final sample are derived from IO different sectors. 
On the whole, an outstanding sector appeared from the sample is Trading 
and Service industry which composes about 43 percents of all companies in 
the sample, subsequently is Consumer product (12 percents), Industrial 
Products (12 percents) and Properties ( 10 percents). Regarding the complete 
details of the industry distribution, kindly refer to Appendix I .  
As regard CEO's networks, the logarithm value of average CEO 
connectedness in the sample is 1.26 direct ties in external boardroom across 
the lifetime, ranging from O to 4.54. This average amount is slightly lower 
than connectedness in the US but it is acceptable due to the different setting 
(Ferhat, Felix & Wintoki, 2016). The range of minimum and the maximum 
value is relatively large where some CEOs have fairly few external direct 
ties while some CEO keenly tied with external directors. The standard 
deviation is 0.9833 which lower than mean signifies that most of the direct 
ties of CEOs in the sample are close to the average given the coefficient of 
variation is less than I .  Accordingly, this result reflects that as a general rule 
CEOs of listed companies seek to develop networking linked to directors. 
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In term of companies' performance, the average of sales growth in the 
sample is 0.1479. In overall, it suggests that the majority companies indicate 
positive growth in their sale performance. The same situation is valid to 
return on assets of companies in which the average return rate is 0.0726. 
To the extent that career paths of CEOs are examined, every CEO of listed 
companies in overall has a relatively long tenure which is held about 8 years 
in existing position. Specifically, the company has longest CEO tenure is 
Genting Plantation Berhad which is 39 years. It is well-matched with the 
viewpoint that the CEO of large companies particularly occupied huge 
market capitalization is enjoyed the high prospect of job retention as 
compared to small companies. 
In relation to another dimension of corporate governance measures to be 
concerned, the size of boards in overall is adequate in size wherein the mean 
value is 9.06 and it is not too small or too big to be managed. From it, the 
company has largest board size is Malaysia Airport Holdings Berhad m 
which I 5 members were served in the board. In addition, the total of 
independent directors in the boardroom also satisfied as the average number 
is 4. I 3 which about 4 persons and reach half of the board size. In the sample, 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad has the most independent directors sit in the board. 
In the context of CEO duality, the average amount is 0 . 1 1  and this result 
indicates that it is not the common phenomenon in Malaysian listed 
companies to have CEO held the chairman position in same time. 
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As concerned to the companies features, the typical leverage level of listed 
companies is 1 . 137  which suggest that the companies depending more on 
the debt in the capital structure to finance the operation. However, the 
average market-to-price ratio is 4.004 and this reflects that the market 
expectation to growth opportunity of I isted companies in overall is relatively 
optimism. The proxy of size is the logarithm of total assets in which the 
mean is 15 .59 19  while the standard deviation is 1 .35 17 .  It reveals that 
Malaysian companies are large in size but the scale of difference also huge. 
4.3 Diagnostic Tests 
Research examination is progressed to testify the results of the empirical 
study and establish the weather the relationships among the variables are 
validity. It is confirmed via several regression tests that are normality 
assumption, heteroscedasticity test, and multicollinearity test to validate the 
models (Tofallis, 2008). These subsequent tests in below are conducted in 
the study. 
4.3.1 Normality Assumption 
As discussed in the previous chapter, normality is relevant for multivariate 
analysis in following the same procedure to best predict the sampling 
distribution of key variables is in the confident interval of the normal 
distribution. To this purpose, Shapiro-Francia test was employed in this 
study to examine the normality assumption of variables in the sample 
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derived from the normal dispensed population. Accordingly, the table in 
below show the Shapiro-Francia test result: 
Table 4.2 
Summary of Shapiro-Francia test (N=JOO). 
Variables w v z Prob>z 
LOGNW 0.9925 0.6870 -0.7430 0.7712 
LOGSG 0.9937 0.5700 - 1 . 1 1 1 0  0.8667 
ROA 0.7642 21.4590 6.0600 0.0000 
TENURE 0.7986 18 .33 10  5.7490 0.0000 
SOB 0.9752 2.2560 1.6080 0.0539 
JOB 0.9800 1.8220 1 . 1860 0 . 1 1 79  
DUALITY 1.0000 0.0000 -62.324 1.0000 
LEVERAGE 0.5372 42 . 1 170  7.3930 0.0000 
MTB 0.36795 57.5160 8.0090 0.0000 
LOGASSET 0.9904 0.8740 -0.2660 0.6048 
From the summary in Table 4.2, the result indicates that the majority 
variables including LOGNW, LOGSG, SOB, JOB, DUALITY and 
LOGASSET are normally distributed given the small number of the 
appealing index; V-value suggests the normality pattern among these 
variables. Simultaneously, it is observed that the p-value of these variables 
is above alpha a level, thus it is failed to reject the null hypothesis and 
reasonable to establish that the sample is normally distributed. In contrast, it 
is noted that ROA, TENURE, LEVERAGE and MTB may not be normally 
distributed given the large V-value and p-value < 0.01 which is very 
significant and reject the null hypothesis to establish the data is not normally 
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distributed. However, such results do not signify that the non-normality is a 
serious issue to any severe intended. It merely reflects that the dataset is 
sufficiently huge to emerge there is detectable not normality in data via the 
parameter of a significant check. 
According to Oztuna, Ethan and Tuccar (2006), if the sample size is 
relatively small that is only I 00 companies in this study, the breach of the 
normality hypothesis should not trigger any serious issues. It is owing to the 
normality test usually has little persuasiveness to decline the null hypothesis 
if the sample size is small, this small sample as a rule regularly passes the 
normality test. The significant results of sampling distribution tend to be 
derived given the small amount of sample data. Toby (2016) also asserts 
that the study still can employ the parametric procedures through the 
variables are non-normally distributed. Accordingly, if the samples 
comprise only I 00 observations, it is able to disregard normally issue. 
4.3.2 Heteroskedasticity Test 
Heteroskedasticity is a common concern in cross-sectional regression 
analysis due to underlying nature of cross-sectional models often causes the 
dependent variables vary in the different way to the population. Given the 
appearance of heteroskedasticity is so significant in the regression testing 
appliance to the extent it will decline the implication of statistical results, 
thus it is necessary to examine whether the models undergo 
heteroskedasticity problem. To this, the Breush-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test 
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and Ramsey RESET test are utilized in the study to assess the 
heteroskedasticity of three models in this study respectively. 
Table 4.3 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Phase 1 Model - Determinants of CEO 's Networks. 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg and Ramsey 
RESET test 
Chi2(1) 1.05 F-statistic (3, 1 . 1 1  
89) 
Probability of 0.3046 Prob.> F 0.3484 
Chi-Square 
From the result in Table 4.3, it is observed the p-value of Breush-Pagan/ 
Cook-Weisberg Test is in excess of 0.05, thus the null hypothesis is 
accepted and there has no significant heteroskedasticity issue among the 
error terms and variables in the model. Also, the p-value of Ramsey RESET 
test is more than 0.05 which suggest the model has no omitted variable. 
Table 4.4 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Phase 2 - CEO 's Networks and Sales Growth. 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg and Ramsey 
RESET test 
Chi2(1) 1.38 F-statistic (3, 0.22 
88) 
Probability of 0.2394 Prob.> F 0.8789 
Chi-Square 
Similarly, there has no significant heteroskedasticity issue in the second 
model as the p-value of Breush-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test is in excess of 
0.05, thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and there has no constant 
variable in the model. The same situation in Ramsey RESET test result 
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where the p-value is more than alpha level and it implies that there has no 
omitted variable m the model. Accordingly, the model is not 
misspecification because of fitted values. 
Table 4.5 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Phase 2 - CEO 's Networks and Return on Assets. 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg and Ramsey 
RESET test 
Chi2(1) 92.33 F-statistic (3, 16.00 
88) 
Probability of 0.000 Prob.> F 0.000 
Chi-Square 
In this model, the p-value of Breush-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test is 0.000 
which less than 0.05, thus the null hypothesis is rejected and it proposes 
significant indication of heteroskedasticity issue. Likewise, the p-value of 
Ramsey RESET test result also 0.000 and implies that there has omitted 
variable in the model. This result also suggests that perhaps non-linear 
arrangements of fitted values help to better explain the dependable variable. 
This result is not surprising as mentioned in the previous chapter the return 
on assets model is theoretically weak due to endogeneity problem among 
accounting performance in term of return on assets and social networks. 
This study only assumes the networks affect return on assets but there are 
studies suggesting that good performance also shape the power of 
networking. To cope with this issue, this study will further perform a 
robustness test and two-stage regression to examine whether the resu It 
remains the same. 
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4.3.3 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity is a situation occurs where there is high correspondence 
among independent variables. If an exact relationship arises across the 
independent variables, it causes the reliable assessment of coefficients for 
each variable unable to be reached. Ultimately, this issue will bring about 
erroneous opinions to the relationship of the response variable and 
explanatory variables. 
To this, a common multicollinearity test is using Pearson Correlation Matrix. 
Pearson Correlation Matrix is one of the common ways to identify any pair­ 
wise relationship among the explanatory variables apiece. If there has 
significantly correlated pattern exists among the explanatory variables to 
explain one and another, thus it is asserted that presence of the 
multicollinearity issue. As indicated m Table 4.6, a highest significant 
correlation being observed from the Pearson Correlation coefficient among 
the explanatory variables is the relationship between MTB ratio and 
leverage ratio in which the coefficient is 0.6691 with the p-value at 0.0 I 
levels. However, Rodger and Nicewander ( 1988) suggested that the 
coefficient from 0.3 to 0.7 just signify a modest linear relationship 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Nevertheless, a Pearson Correlation Matrix may not sufficient to indicate 
the sign of multicollinearity issue. Accordingly, another reliable tool is. 
using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to justify whether the model free 
of multicollinearity. Tables Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 as below indicate the 
VIF test result for each model. 
Table 4.7 




























In VIF test, the extent of multicollinearity is determined by considering the 
VlF value. From the result, the overall VIF value to each variable is less 
than 2.50 and the mean VIF value is around 1 . 6 1 .  Thus, it suggests that 
there was no strong evidence of multicollinearity in this model according to 
the rule of thumb which the multicollinearity is significant when the VlF 
value is more than I O  (Robert, 2007). 
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Table 4.8 
Multicollinearity Test: Phase 2 - CEO's Networks and Sales Growth with 





























0 .61 16  
The multicollinearity results for these two models in the second stage, 
which is CEO's Networks and Sales Growth with CEO's Networks and 
Return on Assets, exactly the same given the independent variables of these 
models are identical. From the result, the overall VIF value to each variable 
of these two models in the second phase also less than 2.50 where the mean 
VIF value is around I .63. Again, it concludes that there was no 
multicollinearity among the variables in these models. 
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4.4 Regression Analysis 
4.4.1 Phase 1 Model: Determinants of CEO's Networks 
To facilitate the investigation of determinants in CEO's networks, a linear 
OLS regression is created to study the relationship. Accordingly, the 
dependent variable in this phase is CEO's networks. The independent 
variables have mainly comprised a set of corporate governance measures, 
with a range of company-specific control variables measures. It is assets that 
companies with particular attributes seek to find CEOs with specific 
qualities, such as connectedness. Below is the regression result for CEO's 
networks model. 
Table 4.9 
Regression Result: Phase 1 - Determinants of CEO 's Networks. 
LOG NW Coefficient Std. Error t-value Sig. 
TENURE 0.0271 0.1068 2.54 0.013** 
SOB 0.1054 0.4640 2.27 0.025** 
IOB -0.0797 0.0822 -0.97 0.335 
DUALITY -0.0807 0.3041 -0.27 0.791 
LEVERAGE -0.0022 0.8421 -0.03 0.980 
MTB -0.0132 0.0152 -0.87 0.388 
LOG ASSET 0.2803 0.0741 3.79 0.000*** 
r-r- 
CONS -3.8931 1 . 1 1 48  -3.49 0.001 
F-statistic (7,92) 6.36 
Prob. F-statistic 0.0000 
R-squared 0.3261 
Adj R-squared 0.2748 
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Note: •• if p :S 0.05, *** if p :S 0.01 signifies the significant level at 5% and 1% 
correspondingly. 
LOGNW is natural logarithm of CEO's networks which is the total connection from current 
engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other activity ties, and education tie. Current 
engagement tie is existing employment between CEO and directors in the external company, 
Previous engagement tie is prior employment between CEO and directors in the external 
company. Other activities tie is active joint membership between CEO and directors in the 
nonprofessional body. Education tie is the same alumni of CEO and directors with interval 
of graduation year not more than two years; LOGSG is natural logarithm of sales growth 
current year sales minus last year sales, then divided by last year sales; ROA is net income 
to total assets; TENURE is number of years CEO held the position in particular company; 
SOB is number of director in the board; 108 is number of independent directors serve on 
the board; Duality is CEO or chairman duality, I if the CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE is ratio of long-term debt and short-term debts to total equity; MTB is market 
capitalization to company book value market to book ratio; LOGASSET is natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
From the Table 4.9, there are two explanatory variables from the predicted 
model have indicated the significant relationship with CEO's networks 
which are: TENURE and SOB. Each of these variables has low p-value (less 
than 0.05) thus it signifies the null hypothesis is rejected and such predictor 
is meaningful to the variation in the dependent variable, CEO's networking. 
At first, the TENURE variable constitutes a significant effect of the 
explained variation on CEO's networks with the coefficient size of 0.0271. 
A positive value of TENURE parameter suggests a positive relationship 
between CEO tenure and CEO's networks. Thus, the first hypothesis is 
supported in this case given the result suggests that an entrenched CEO with 
long tenure tend to pose better connectedness in the position. 
As regard to the size of the board, the coefficient of SOB is 0.1054 in which 
the positive estimate suggests a positive and significant relationship between 
the size of boards and CEO's networks. Accordingly, it is implied that the 
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result established strong evidence for the second hypothesis to verify the 
companies with large board size be likely to hire CEO with outsized 
networks. 
In addition, the same case also supported in control variable, where the beta 
measure of LOGASSET is 0.2803 also implies a positive significant 
correlation between company size and CEO's networks. However, there are 
few predictors assumed to be insignificant in the results given the high p­ 
value suggest the null hypothesis cannot be rejected even the fraction of 
each variable is relatively large. In overall, the adjusted R-squared value of 
0.2748 is comparable with previous studies which also at the level of 0.31 
(Kirchmaier & Stathopoulos, 2008) and it indicate the study is in a standard 
complete level and CEO's networks are positively affected by CEO tenure 
and size of the board. 
4.4.2 Phase 2 Model: CEO's Networks and Performance of Company 
i. Sales Growth 
As step to two contradicting theories underlined in this study, social 
network theory proposes a positive linkage between CEO connectedness 
and growth of sales performance. To examine for the consequence of CEO's 
networks connection on company performance explicitly, this study utilizes 
two diverse set of performance measures, which are: sales growth and return 
on asset. To begin with, this study firstly evaluates the consequence of CEO 
connectedness on sales growth. Below is the regression result of the model. 
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Table 4 . 10  
Regression Result: Phase 2 - CEO 's Networks and Sales Growth. 
LOGSG Coefficient Std. Error I-value Sig. 
LOG NW 0.0022 0.0010 2.19 0.031 ** 
TENURE -0.0003 0.0001 -2.35 0.021 ** 
SOB -0.0002 0.0005 -0.35 0.725 
JOB 0.0013 0.0008 1.58 0 . 1 1 8  
DUALITY 0.0046 0.0030 1 .55 0.125 
LEVERAGE -0.0005 0.0008 -0.66 0.508 
MTB 0.0004 0.0001 2.63 0.010** 
LOGASSET 0.0064 0.0008 8.30 0.000*** 
CONS 0.0424 0 .01 147 3.69 0.000 
F-statistic (8, 91) 18.60 
Prob. F-statistic 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6205 
Adj R-squared 0.5871 
Note:** ifp :S: 0.05, ••• ifp :S 0.01 signifies the significant level at 5% and 1% 
correspondingly. 
LOGNW is natural logarithm ofCEO)s networks which is the total connection from current 
engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other activity ties, and education tie. Current 
engagement tie is existing employment between CEO and directors in the external company. 
Previous engagement tie is prior employment between CEO and directors in external 
company. Other activities tie is active joint membership between CEO and directors in the 
nonprofessional body. Education tie is the same alumni of CEO and directors with interval 
of graduation year not more than two years; LOGSG is natural logarithm of sales growth 
current year sales minus last year sales, then divided by last year sales; ROA is net income 
to total assets; TENURE is number of years CEO held the position in particular company; 
SOB is number of director in the board; IOB is number of independent directors serve on 
the board; Duality is CEO or chairman duality, 1 if the CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE is ratio of long term debt and short term debts to total equity; MTB is market 
capitalization to company book value market to book ratio; LOGASSET is natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
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From the Table 4. 10,  it can be observed that two predictor variables 
indicated a significant relationship with sales growth in the models which 
are: LOGNW and TENURE. 
Initially, CEO's networks are positively related to sales growth wherein a 
positive coefficient of 0.0022 with the p-value in a significant pattern. Such 
result suggests that a better connectedness CEO tend to add value to sales 
performance. Thus, the third hypothesis is verified in this study and it 
established proof to reveal CEO's networks are positively related to sales 
growth in Malaysia listed companies. 
However, the result also suggests that CEO tenure is negatively correlated 
with sales growth by way of the coefficient up to -0.0003. The correlation 
also valid in control variables where there is a positive relationship between 
market to book ratio and firm size with sales growth given the coefficient to 
these variables are 0.0004 and 0.0064 respectively. It implies that 
companies with high-growing and large size more likely to experience 
positive sales growth. In general, the high adjusted R-squared value of 
0.5871 indicates that the study is fairly conducted and sales performance is 
positively linked to CEO's networks in a significant pattern. However, such 
R-squared value is very different from previous study which at the 0 . 10 
level (Kirchmaier & Stathopoulos, 2008) and the main reasons perhaps 
owing to this study only evaluates I 00 companies sample data and the 
difference in the site setting. 
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ii. Return on Assets 
In the next step of this phase, this study follows agency theory by conducts 
another test to justify the consequence of networks on return on assets. 
However, given the heteroskedasticity issue in this model, this study 
conducts a robustness check to test for standard errors. Often, a case where 
robust prediction ought to be examined if there is a significant doubt 
ofheteroskedasticity. A simple way (Tofallis, 2008) is to relate least squares 
to standard errors as this eases the impact of huge amount in the dependent 
variable better than ordinary least squares. 
Table 4 . 1 1  
Robust Regression Result: Phase 2 - CEO 's Networks and Return on Assets. 
ROA Coefficient Std. Error t-value Sig. 
LOG NW -0.0049 0.0072 -0.68 0.498 
TENURE 0.0003 0.0007 0.45 0.655 
SOB -0.0021 0.0025 -0.86 0.390 
108 -0.0039 0.0052 -0.74 0.460 
DUALITY 0.0010 0.0159 0.06 0.949 
LEVERAGE -0.0293 0.0109 -2.68 0.009*** 
MTB 0.0098 0.0030 3.23 0.002*** 
LOG ASSET -0.0110 0.0066 -1.67 0.097 
CONS 0.2776 0.1076 2.58 0.01 1  
F-statistic (8, 91) 4.59 
Prob. F-statistic 0.0001 
R-squared 0.5203 
Adj R-squared 0.0742 
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Note:*** ifp :s; 0.01 signifies the significant level at 1%. 
LOGNW is natural logarithm ofCEO's networks which is the total connection from current 
engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other activity ties, and education tie. Current 
engagement tie is existing employment between CEO and directors in the external company. 
Previous engagement tie is prior employment between CEO and directors in the external 
company, Other activities tie is active joint membership between CEO and directors in 
nonprofessional body. Education tie is the same alumni of CEO and directors with interval 
of graduation year not more than two years; LOGSG is natural logarithm of sales growth 
current year sales minus last year sales, then divided by last year sales; ROA is net income 
to total assets; TENURE is number of years CEO held the position in particular company; 
SOB is number of director in the board; IOB is number of independent directors serve on 
the board; Duality is CEO or chairman duality, I if the CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE is ratio of long-term debt and short term-debts to total equity; MTB is market 
capitalization to company book value market to book ratio; LOGASSET is natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
From the Table 4 . 1 1 ,  the robustness result is almost similar to linear 
regression result where none of the independent variables was significant 
with return on assets. Such result is expected due to the theoretical 
weaknesses in the model because of possible endogeneity problem among 
return on assets and the networks that considerable to the extent unable be 
solved in this model. As mentioned, if using the return on assets model, it 
implies this study simply consider one direction of relationship where the 
networks influence the financial performance variables as the only real 
direction. Although this study hypothesizes that the networks drive financial 
performance such as return on assets, alternatively there is also a 
proposition suggests the performance be capable to shape the networks. On 
the whole, the R-squared value of 0.5203 is somewhat higher than the result 
in previous study which is around 0.32 (Kirchmaier & Stathopoulos, 2008). 
Again, the underlying reasons maybe as a consequence of difference in 
sample size and the setting of sites. 
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iv. Two Stage Regression ofRetnrn on Assets Model 
To examine the suspected endogeneity issue, this study applies the 
suggestions of Fich and Shivdasani (2006) to testify such 'inverse' 
connection as the robustness check. Hence, this study develops an equations 
system and test a two-stage least square regression which is robustness 
model of return on assets with the fitted value of LOGNW to analysis the 
relationship in the networking and performance. 
Table 4.12 
Two-Stage Regression Result (First Model): Phase 2 - Return on Assets and 
CEO 's Networks. 
LOG NW Coefficient Std. Error t-value Sig. 
ROA -0.6249 1 . 1856  -0.53 0.599 
TENURE 0.0272 0.0107 2.54 0.013*** 
SOB -0.1038 0.0467 2.22 0.029** 
IOB -0.0819 0.0826 -0.99 0.324 
DUALITY -0.0798 0.3053 -0.26 0.794 
LEVERAGE -0.0205 0.0914 -0.22 0.823 
MTB -0.0070 0.0192 -0.37 0.715 
LOG ASSET 0.2726 0.0758 3.60 0.001 *** 
CONS -3.7078 1.1732 -3.16 0.002 
F-statistic (8, 91) 5.56 
Prob. F-statistic 0.0000 
R-squared 0.3282 
Adj R-squared 0.2691 
Note:** ifp S 0.05, *** ifp S 0.01 signifies the significant level at 5% and 1% 
correspondingly. 
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LOGNW is natural logarithm of CEO's networks which is the total connection from current 
engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other activity ties, and education tie. Current 
engagernent tie is existing employment between CEO and directors in the external company, 
Previous engagement tie is prior employment between CEO and directors in the external 
company. Other activities tie is active joint membership between CEO and directors in 
nonprofessional body. Education tie is the same alumni of CEO and directors with interval 
of graduation year not more than two years; LOGSG is natural logarithm of sales growth 
current year sales minus last year sales, then divided by last year sales; ROA is net income 
to total assets; TENURE is number of years CEO held the position in particular company; 
SOB is number of director in the board; JOB is number of independent directors serve on 
the board; Duality is CEO or chairman duality, I if the CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE is ratio of long-term debt and short term-debts to total equity; MTB is market 
capitaliz.ation to company book value market to book ratio; LOGASSET is natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
From the Table 4.12, the first model of two-stage regression is initially 
applying the ROA as the new independent variable in CEO's networks 
model of phase I to test the inverse relationship between CEO's networks 
and return on assets. However, there has no relationship exist in the inverse 
test of return on assets and CEO's networks. On the whole, the adjusted R- 
squared value of 0.2691 indicates that the study is fairly performed. 
Table 4 . 13  
Two-Stage Regression Result (Second Model): Phase 2 - Fitted Value of 
CEO 's Networks and Return on Assets. 
ROA Coefficient Std. Error z-value Sig. 
LOGNW" -0.0030 0.0248 -0.12 0.905 
LEVERAGE -0.0301 0.0071 -4.25 0.000••• 
� 
MTB 0.0100 0.0014 7.27 0.000••• 
LOGASSET -0.0130 0.0097 - 1 .35 0 . 178  
.- 
CONS 0.2736 0.1261 2 . 17 0.030 
Wald chi2 (4) I 05.45 










TENURE SOB 108 DUALITY 
Tests of Endogcneity: Ho: variables are exogenous 
Durbin (score) chi2(1): 0.005217 (p = 0.9424) 
Wu-Hausman F(l,94): 0.004904 (p = 0.9443) 
Note:*** ifp :S 0.01 signifies the significant level at 1%. 
LOGNW is natural logarithm ofCEO's networks which is the total connection from current 
engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other activity ties, and education tie. Current 
engagement tie is existing employment between CEO and directors in the external company. 
Previous engagement tie is prior employment between CEO and directors in the external 
company. Other activities tie is active joint membership between CEO and directors in 
nonprofessional body. Education tie is the same alumni of CEO and directors with interval 
of graduation year not more than two years; LOGSG is natural logarithm of sales growth 
current year sales minus last year sales, then divided by last year sales; ROA is net income 
to total assets; TENURE is number of years CEO held the position in particular company; 
SOB is number of director in the board; 108 is number of independent directors serve on 
the board; Duality is CEO or chairman duality, I if the CEO is chairman, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE is ratio of long-term debt and short term-debts to total equity; MTB is market 
capitalization to company book value market to book ratio; LOGASSET is natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
In the second model of two-stage regression analysis, it is robustness model 
of ROA with the fitted value of LOGNW to analysis the linkage between 
CEO's networks and financial performance. In order to constantly assess 
this model, it is needed to specify the instrumental variables, a new variable 
that is unrelated to error terms however connected to the instrumented 
variable, LOGNW. Accordingly, the corporate governance measures such as 
TENURE, SOB, JOO and DUALITY were used to instruct the fitted value 
of the instrumented variable, LOGNW. Using the two-stage regression 
function in Stata software, the result in above indicate that fitted value of 
CEO's networking LOGNW" is remained insignificant to ROA and the 
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endogeneity test indicate the variables are exogenous. Thus, this result 
suggests it is proper to follow the test in linear regression. 
4.5 Result Discussions 
4.5.1 Phase 1 Model - Determinants of CEO's Networks 
As regards to hypothesis I, it is observed from the result indicates that 
CEOs with the longer tenure is positively related with her connectedness. 
This result is in line to Nguyen-Dang (2012) have observed a positive 
correlation in the European context, and it is reasonable to consider that 
CEOs in Malaysian companies would form powerful base of social 
influences across time to gain social support and safeguard against turnover 
from their networks. Also, Allgood and Farrell (2003) have documented that 
CEO with longer tenure has more heterogeneity and better match to the 
company. In overall, these results are in line with social networks theory 
suggests the connectedness of CEOs as driven to the organization change in 
CEO's selection process. Thus, hypothesis I is supported by the study. 
In addition, there is evidence reveals that large boards from large companies, 
symbolized via a great size of board, are keenly seeking for better­ 
connected CEOs in their nomination process. The boards value deeply of 
the sound information flow, expertise exchange and superior innovation 
capabilities of better-connectedness executives, and keenly choosing them 
as CEOs. According to Yermack (1996) who observes large boards are 
likely to embed and link to proper CEOs such as equipped with better 
connection background. As predicted, this study also examines a significant 
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positive relationship in the CEO's networks and board size. Also, Daito et al. 
(1999) have found that large boards also facilitate for rich connections and 
plentiful beneficial interlocking among top executives and directors. 
Similarly, Brown, Lee, Gao and Stathopoulos (2012) in their study also 
establish that board size appear as key corporate governance measure that 
shape a marginal effect to impact the networking power of CEOs. 
It is consistent with the view that large companies are innately complex 
which call for and equipped plentiful resources. In developing countries 
context, Oyewale et al. (2016) further exhibit the board size act as critical 
measure to drive the external networking of board members thus shape the 
positive growth of business performance in Nigeria. Previous studies also 
suggest that three forms of companies might most beneficial from the 
features of better-connected CEO that is the companies with noteworthy 
growth prospect, the companies are experiencing stress of leveraged, and 
large companies with outsized boardroom (Adams et al., 2003; Brown et al., 
2012; and Subrahmanyam, 2008). The result asserts that the companies with 
large board size. are keen to search for better-connected CEOs. 
Thus, this study indicates that the sound connectedness of CEOs is 
positively linked to indicators of companies and board size. But, there has 
no vividly proof about either high growth or high debt-leveraged companies 
finding better-connected CEOs. However, the result indicates that 
hypothesis 2 is valid in the study. 
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4.5.2 Phase 2 Model: CEO's Networks and Performance of Company 
In this study, the performance of companies is rooted in term of both sales 
growth and return on assets. As examining the consequence of a CEO's 
networks on companies' sales performance, the result has established a 
significant positive relationship. Accordingly, this study observed empirical 
evidence to support hypothesis 3. Explicitly, this study found that better­ 
connected CEOs do utilize their networks to enhance companies' 
performance, in term of the growth in sales outcomes. The results support 
that the effort of better-connected CEOs devoted to networks can add to the 
innovative process or to a certain extent, access to open doors that adding 
value to the sales process and companies' performance. 
Notably, this result is opposed to the research of Kirchmaier et al (2008) 
which cannot establish a relationship exists in the networks of CEO and 
sales growth. However, such finding is in line with the later study of Fang, 
Francis and Hasan (2012) which suggests that the attribute of CEO networks 
facilitate superior innovation and shape a positive influence on sales growth. 
Hence, it seems that the CEO's networks shape a beneficial consequence on 
Malaysian listed companies' performance. This evidence is supportive to 
the social networks theory. Again, this study justifies the supposition of 
appointing better connectedness CEOs is value added to sales performance. 
In contrast, at time this study scrutinizing the relationship between a CEO's 
networking ties on companies accounting performance in term of return on 
assets (ROA), the result indicates no significant relationship exist in CEO's 
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networking and ROA. Explicitly, this study has conducted goes further to 
perform robustness check and two-stage regressions with the aim to ease 
any heteroskedasticity and possible endogeneity problem in the model. 
However, none of the tests indicates significant relationship exists in CEO's 
networks and ROA. Hence, the results imply that hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
This is an important finding, as it raises considerable doubt about the 
validity of agency theory assumption that predicts the CEO's networks 
create agency costs offset its advantages and undermine the accounting 
performance of companies in Malaysia. As regards with the linkage between 
CEO's networks and ROA, this result is inconsistent to Kirchamaier's (2008) 
which has observed significant and negative relationship on the UK contexts. 
However, Fracassi and Tate (2012) observe that the connected board shape 
a lower but insignificant impact to a range of performance indicators for the 
US companies including ROA which fairly similar to the result of this study. 
Also, such result is somewhat comparable to the study of Haslindar and 
Fazilah (2011) concerning the networks consequence on Malaysia 
companies in case of family ownership also insignificantly and negatively 
with ROA. Prior studies also point outs the likelihood due to cultural 
disparities, the nature and effect of managers in agency theory not always 
reflected by the social context of non-western economies such as Malaysia 
(Mustapha & Ahmad, 2 0 1 1 ;  and Nor Zalina, 2016). For instance, the unique 
social context of Malaysia particularly family-owned business tend to have 
their relative members serve in the key management position such as CEOs 
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to exert their influences in business contact relationship thus diminish the 
operation threats and agency monitoring costs (Mustapha & Ahmad, 2 0 1 1  ). 
It is true in this study given there are 34 family-owned companies in the 
sample of this study (Please refer to Appendix 2). 
At this instant, this study merely can suppose about probable causes as 
regards this result. Probably a potential explanation is the study only 
considering top I 00 listed non-financial companies performance in the 
sample, perhaps the result will be improved if extend the sample size to 
include more companies. Another reason is this study only including the 
large listed non-financial companies in accordance to the market 
capitalization; however, the small and medium companies are not included. 
Possibly, the inclusions of diverse size companies will benefit the findings 
of this study by furnish more inclusive and multivariate sample. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examinees and give detail about the results of the analysis 
consistent with the research objectives. This chapter also presents the 
diagnostic tests results to examme the validity of the models. Most 
important, the empirical results obtained from regression test were 
examined to justify the relationships among key variables in suggested 
models. As well, the results of some robustness tests were discussed. At last, 
it is ended with the discussions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The initial part of this chapter offers a review of the study after that the 
contributions of the study. Few limitations inbuilt in the study are 
highlighted in later section with the suggestions in support of the future 
study being discussed in the final part. 
5.2 Conclusion of Study 
This study seeks to examine in the career field of CEOs whether 'who you 
know is more imperative than what you know', and if situation that such 
influenced nomination process subsists - whether it is value adding or value 
destroying to the companies. As well, this study aims to identify whether the 
connection to sound networks is key attribute the boards seek as selecting a 
CEO. Regrettably, the existing theoretical models only offer little direction 
in this aspect. Whereas severe sociologists and organizational studies 
frequently highlight about the positive facets of social networks, however, 
financial and economists' academics very much linked to the ground 
assume a sceptical perspective and assert that CEOs employ their networks 
to extort personal rents from the managed companies to the cost of owners. 
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To sum with, the outcome of this study in overall has established proof to 
the achievement of defined research objectives. Explicitly, the overview of 
key findings in this study has been summarising in the Table 4 . 14 :  
Table 4 . 14  
Objective Achievements of the Study. 
Objective Achievement Hypothesis Support 
To examine the relationship between 
CEO tenure and the networks of CEO Achieved. HI Supported. 
of Malaysian listed companies. 
To examine the relationship between 
board size and the networks of CEO Achieved. H2 Supported. 
of Malaysian listed companies. 
To examine the relationship between 
the networks of CEO and sales growth Achieved. H3 Supported. 
in Malaysian listed companies. 
To examine the relationship between 
No 
the networks of CEO and return on Achieved. H4 
asset in Malaysian listed companies. 
Supported. 
To start with, this study initially has established evidence correspond to first 
research objective and found that better connectednesses CEOs are 
developed as they are embedded and have longer tenure in the companies. 
Accordingly, the HI hypothesis is being supported. It is perceived that CEO 
would develop social networks base across time. They would fine-tune their 
positions and promptly expand sound working connections with other 
executives of management teams, directors' board and influential external 
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stakeholders. When the time goes by, whereas sitting CEOs have 
established their influential capability and leadership support in the office, 
the base of social networks would then be stronger. Perhaps it is linked to 
the learning process of CEO in their job performance. At their early stage in 
tenure, CEO is inclined to learn fast and assume risks. At the time of tenure 
growth, a better-connected CEO is well performing in exert a positive 
influence on sales performance. However, such effect became evident in 
later tenure as well connected CEO tends to commit to an entrenched status 
to adapt to new beneficial networks. From the results, this study asserts that 
CEO tenure can shape significant influence in both CEO's networks and 
hence the performance which far further than an easy direct relationship. 
As well, this study in achieving second research objectives has observed 
additional facts in support of the social networks theorists, as large 
companies with large board assign CEOs with better connectedness. This 
evidence agrees with the sociologists, who assert the favourable length of 
social networks in support to large companies. Hence, the H2 hypothesis 
also supported. It appears that board committees consider that the 
advantages of appointing a better-connected CEO to sit in the chair 
compensate the related agency costs. This fact also in line with corporate 
literature suggest social networks may more substance for large companies, 
whose described as multifaceted in their nature and required value-added 
from proper-built resources like strong networks to cope externalities threats. 
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In term of company performance, this study comes into view to be at 
preliminary contradictive viewpoint as it observes some evidence with 
respect to both theories. Explicitly, and confirm the supposition of social 
networks academics, the study in response to third research objective was 
capable to justify that a CEO's networks have a positive consequence on 
companies performance in their operating course. This finding supports the 
H3 hypothesis. The results are rooted in an inventive new measure of CEO's 
networks, which considers the collective amount of direct ties built by a 
CEO across the lifetime. It seems the networks of better connectedness 
CEOs be able to improve the companies' performance in term of sales 
growth, which in line with social network theory. This appears that CEOs 
employ their social power has seized better access to the networks for 
information exchange and innovative learning enhance the sales 
performance. 
On the other hand, this studies as achieving the final research objective, 
however, unable to examine the strong relationship among CEO's networks 
and return on assets. Consequently, the H4 hypothesis is not supported. The 
results were further robust to diverse arrangements but no empirically 
significant, either using robustness checks or two-stage regression analysis. 
Perhaps one of the reason bring about this result is owing to the limitation in 
term of sample data. This issue will be discussed further in limitation 
section. 
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At this instant, this study can merely suggest about the better-connected 
CEOs adding value to companies' performance. It perhaps reasonable to 
presume, even if, that the values of preserving CEO's networks compensate 
the costs to the companies, which in line with the relation-oriented 
governance in the Asian economy. To sum with, the results o this study 
point to that follow the Popper ( I 959)'s suggestion of theories competition, 
social networks theory appears to be better suited to reflect the results. This 
theory is defending the supposition of CEO's networking influence over the 
agency theorists in Malaysia context. 
5.3 Contributions of Study 
Initially, one of the contributions in this study is describing the social 
integration of directors via board interlocking broadly using new inventive 
measures to better capture the social network coverage of an executive 
director, as proposed by Cohen et al. (2008), Engelberg et al. (2012), 
Fraccasi & Tate (2011) and Nguyen (2012). The board interlocking in 
previous literature was often measuring existing strong ties but weak ties 
and ties developed from prior connection being omitted. Accordingly, the 
networks of CEOs in this study are measured via the cumulative direct ties 
that built across her lifetime. The relationships from the network of prior 
employment, education alumni or other activities are evidently and 
explicitly described rooted in openly accessible information on career and 
personal backgrounds of the connected directors. It is worth to note that 
alumni and other activities networks also exert a significant function in 
Malaysian society. Such network's exposure is sufficiently wide to fairly 
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-- 
reflect the population of directors and to prevent unclear or too specific 
personal connections that are exposed to possible conflicts, inducing 
unnecessary noisy to generate the empirical evidence. 
Next, this study also extends existing literature via examining the influence 
of executive director or CEO's networks to the company's performance. 
Explicitly, the current academic studies only furnish little light in this field. 
Despite the fact that sociologist and organizational studies capture about the 
positive dimension of network connections, yet financial and economists' 
academics frequently probe into the ground by suppose a suspicious 
standpoint and claim that CEOs utilize their personal networks to pursue 
personal rents and interests from the companies to the harm of owners. Thus, 
this study is pursuing social networks viewpoint to examine the possible 
value adding from social networks. 
Also, this study contributes to present literature via adopting a competing 
theory framework to examine the construct of interest. Explicitly, two 
theories were used to guide this study where social network theory suggests 
a positive side of social networks while the agency theory predicts a 
negative correlation in the social networks and companies performance. 
Through this manner, it allows a more inclusive perspective to study the 
influence of CEO's networks whether value adding or value damaging to 
companies' performance. It is interesting to examine which theory best 






5.4 Limitation of Study 
One of the most remarked limitations of this study is the cross-sectional 
design. Consequently, a definite conclusion as regards the directions of 
relationship in the models would far than to be easily highlighted. Therefore, 
the relationships of variables ought to be interpreted with caution. Perhaps a 
completeness causal conclusion is only to be verified from testing the 
models by way of longitudinal panel data. 
A further inadequacy in this study is the selected sample simply focuses to 
top I 00 non-financial listed companies in proportion to their market 
capitalization. Such sample is relatively small amount of the total population 
of listed companies in the market. Furthermore, the selected sample is 
focused to large market capitalized companies but ignore small and medium 
size companies. Hence, a study with bigger sample size is much preferable 
to enhance generalization and validate the findings. 
Next, a limitation of this study is data gathering was confined to one site 
which is Malaysia. Due to the difference in the setting, the results of this 
study would not be applicable or fairly reflect the situation in other nations. 
For instance, the UK's studies have documented the consequence of CEO's 
networks in a reverse way due to differences of setting. A duplication of this 
study at other nations would facilitate better generalization of the results. 
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5.5 Recommendation for Future Researches 
Drawing from the results and limitation underlined in previous sections, few 
recommendations are addressed by the end of this study. The existing study 
can be lengthened in several manners. 
One of the suggestions for future studies is to the investigation at a 
difference and larger sample size. To this point, the procedure of assembling 
reliable data as regards CEO's network is rather time-consuming, thus the 
sample size of this study is only focus on top 100 listed companies. If with 
the conditions permit, the weakness of current study may be retrieved via 
the best use of a large and diverse sample. Even it perhaps calls for long 
haul doing the data collection; however, the reliable outcome is worth it. 
Next, it is interested to expand the findings of this study to the other sites. 
Due to the disparity in the setting, the results of new research in other 
nations may or may not fairly reflect the situation of this study. A 
duplication of this study at other nations would facilitate better 
generalization of the results. 
Lastly, a study can be extended to consider the boundary condition of social 
ties. This study simply measures the cumulative connections without 
considering the direction of social ties. A study can distinguish the 
networking between informal networks such as family relatives and alumni 
or networks developed by the professional associates to examine the relative 
importance of these networks. 
105 
.- 
To sum with, this study is using the measures to assess the CEO's networks 
effect for I 00 non-financial companies in Malaysia and suggested that the 
companies with large board size are eagerly seeking for CEOs with an 
outsized social network. From it, it is observed that the CEO's networks 
have significant impact on the companies' performance which chiefly refers 
to sales growths in positive manner. However, the result did not indicate a 
significant relationship between the CEO's networks and return on assets. In 
overall, the results imply that social networks theory appears to be well­ 
matched to reflect the situation in Malaysia context regarding the better­ 
connected CEOs delivery value to companies' performance in the course of 
their social network. This theory is defending the supposition of CEO's 
networking influence over the agency theorists in Malaysia context. In 
future study, it is suggested to employ different and large sample size in 
same setting, or different site location in addition to considering different 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I: Proportional of Companies in Sample per Industry (N=/00) 
Industry Number of Companies Percentage 
Construction 2 2% 
Consumer Products 12 12% 
Hotels 1 1% 
Industrial Products 12 12% 
Infrastructure Project Compauy 4 4°/o 
Plantation 8 8% 
Properties 10 10% 
Real Estate Investment Trust 4 4% 
Technology 4 4% 
Trading-Services 43 43% 
TOTAL 100 100% 
Appendix 2: List of Top JOO Companies in the Sample of Study (N=IOO) 
No Company Category 
I Tenaga Nasional Berhad Government-linked 
2 Sime Darby Berhad Government-linked 
3 Petronas Chemicals Group Berhad Government-linked 
4 IHH Healthcare Berhad Private-Owned 
5 Axiata Group Berhad Private-Owned 
6 Maxis Berhad Private-Owned 
7 Digi.Com Berhad Private-Owned 
8 Genting Berhad Family-Owned 
9 Petronas Gas Berhad Government-linked 
1 0  Genting Malaysia Berhad Family-Owned 
I I  MISC Berhad Government-linked 
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No Company Category 
1 2  IOI Corporation Berhad Family-Owned 
1 3  Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad Family-Owned 
14 Petronas Dagangan Berhad Government-I inked 
1 5  Telekom Malaysia Berhad Government-linked 
1 6  Hap Seng Consolidated Berhad Private-Owned 
1 7  Nestle (Malaysia) Berhad Private-Owned 
1 8  PPB Group Berhad Family-Owned 
1 9  YTL Corporation Berhad Family-Owned 
20 Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad Government-linked 
21 Astro Malaysia Holdings Berhad Private-Owned 
22 KLCC Property Holdings Berhad Government-linked 
23 Westports Holdings Berhad Private-Owned 
24 Gamuda Berhad Private-Owned 
25 
British American Tobacco 
(Malaysia) Berhad Private-Owned 
26 IJM Corporation Berhad Private-Owned 
27 Airasia Berhad Private-Owned 
28 YTL Power International Berhad Family-Owned 
29 IOI Properties Group Berhad Family-Owned 
30 Dialog Group Berhad Family-Owned 
3 1  Hartalega Holdings Berhad Family-Owned 
32 S P Setia Berhad Government-linked 
33 Sunway Berhad Family-Owned 
34 Fraser & Neave Holdings Berhad Private-Owned 
35 Genting Plantations Berhad Family-Owned 
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No Company Category 
36 Batu Kawan Berhad Family-Owned 
37 MMC Corporation Berhad Government-linked 
38 Top Glove Corporation Berhad Family-Owned 
39 QL Resources Berhad Family-Owned 
40 UMW Holdings Berhad Government-linked 
41  
Felda Global Ventures Holdings Government-linked 
Berhad 
42 !GB Real Estate Investment Trust Family-Owned 
43 Heineken Malaysia Berhad Private-Owned 
44 United Plantations Berhad Private-Owned 
45 Lafarge Malaysia Berhad Private-Owned 
46 Boustead Holdings Berhad Private-Owned 
47 Time Dotcom Berhad Government-linked 
48 UEM Sunrise Berhad Government-linked 
49 Malakoff Corporation Ber had Private-Owned 
50 
Pavilion Real Estate Investment Private-Owned 
Trust 
51  Sunway Real Estate Investment Trust Family-Owned 
52 KP J Healthcare Ber had Private-Owned 
53 Carlsberg Brewery Malaysia Berhad Private-Owned 
54 UOA Development Berhad Family-Owned 
55 Bumi Armada Berhad Private-Owned 
56 Cahya Mata Sarawak Berhad Private-Owned 
57 Pos Malaysia Berhad Government-linked 
58 Kossan Rubber Industries Berhad Private-Owned 
59 Oriental Holdings Berhad Family-Owned 
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No Company Category 
60 Yinson Holdings Berhad Family-Owned 
61 !GB Corporation Berhad Family-Owned 
62 Gas Malaysia Berhad Private-Owned 
63 Dutch Lady Milk Industries Berhad Private-Owned 
64 Mah Sing Group Berhad Family-Owned 
65 DRB-Hicom Berhad Government-linked 
66 Berjaya Sports Toto Berhad Family-Owned 
67 
Lingkaran Trans Kota Holdings Private-Owned 
Berhad 
68 Aeon Co. (M) Berhad Private-Owned 
69 Malaysian Pacific Industries Berhad Private-Owned 
70 Unisem (M) Berhad Family-Owned 
71 MSM Malaysia Holdings Berhad Government-linked 
72 Bintulu Port Holdings Berhad Government-linked 
73 IJM Plantations Berhad Private-Owned 
74 Magnum Berhad Private-Owned 
75 
Malaysian Resources Corporation Government-linked 
Berhad 
76 Tan Chong Motor Holdings Berhad Family-Owned 
77 
Shangri-La Hotels (Malaysia) Family-Owned 
Ber had 
78 Kian Joo Can Factory Berhad Private-Owned 
79 Uchi Technologies Berhad Family-Owned 
80 TSH Resources Berhad Family-Owned 
81 Eastern & Oriental Berhad Private-Owned 
82 Selangor Properties Berhad Private-Owned 
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No Company Category 
83 Globetronics Technology Berhad Family-Owned 
84 Amway (Malaysia) Holdings Berhad Private-Owned 
85 Berjaya Land Berhad Family-Owned 
86 
Malaysia Marine and Heavy 
Engineering Holdings Berhad Government-linked 
87 Star Media Group Berhad Government-linked 
88 Dayang Enterprise Holdings Berhad Family-Owned 
89 MBM Resources Berhad Private-Owned 
90 Media Prima Berhad Government-linked 
91 Mulpha International Berhad Private-Owned 
92 Parkson Holdings Berhad Family-Owned 
93 
UMW Oil & Gas Corporation Government-linked 
Berhad 
94 Sapura Energy Berhad Private-Owned 
95 
Press Metal Aluminium Holdings Family-Owned 
Berhad 
96 MY E.G. Services Berhad Government-linked 
97 Inari Amertron Berhad Private-Owned 
98 
Eco World Development Group Private-Owned 
Berhad 
99 Scientex Berhad Family-Owned 
100 GD Express Carrier Berhad Private-Owned 
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Appendix 3: CEO's Networks 
CEO's network (LGNW) is a collective measure that computing by 
accumulate all direct ties of the CEO has built across her lifetime. This 
study follows the suggestion of Fracassi and Tate (2012) to take account all 
forms of current engagement tie, previous engagement tie, other activity ties, 
and education tie. Current engagement tie denotes the connection from 
existing employment of minimum one common company the director and 
CEO is externally engaged with. Previous engagement tie denotes the 
connection from past employment of minimum one common company the 
director and CEO were externally engaged with. Other activity ties signify 
that the connection from joint membership of minimum one nonprofessional 
bodies that director and CEO together actively engaged with. Education tie 
indicates that the connection from same alumni of minimum one schools 
that director and CEO together attended with at any time, excluding the 
interval of graduation year more than two years. 
For example, a CEO from Batu Kawan Berhad is currently served externally 
as director in the boardroom of Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad (KLK), 
Synthomer Pie and See Sen Chemical Berhad. Besides, he holds some level 
of interest in Wan Hin Investment. In prior, he started his career path as 
purchasing officer in KLK and served before in the broad of Asia Pacific 
Specialty Chemicals Ltd and Heitech Pudu Berhad. Also, he acts as 
President for Perak Chinese Maternity Association, and trustee of several 
foundations such as Yayasan KLK, Yayasan De La Salle and Tan Sri Lee 
Loy Seng Foundation. He was graduated as bachelor holder from London 
School of Economics and Political Science and Master Degree of Stanford 
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University. Accordingly, the networks of such CEO for each tie are 
computed as below: 
Number of Ties 
Current engagement tie: 
a) Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad: 3 
- Tan Sri Dato' Seri Lee Oi Hian (Director) 
- Dato Yeoh Eng Khoon (Director) 
- Mustafa Bin Mohamad Ali (Director) 
b) See Sen Chemical Berhad 1 
- Dato Yeoh Eng Khoon (Director) 
c) Wan Hin Investment I 
- Tan Sri Dato' Seri Lee Oi Hian (Shareholder) 
5 
Previous engagement tie: 
a) Synthomer Pie 2 
- Tan Sri Dato' Seri Lee Oi Hian (Director) 
- Mustafa Bin Mohamad Ali (Director) 
2 
Other activity ties: 
a) Yayasan KLK 3 
- Tan Sri Dato' Seri Lee Oi Hian (Trustee) 
- Dato Yeoh Eng K.hoon (Trustee) 
- Mustafa Bin Mohamad Ali Trustee (Trustee) 
b) Tan Sri Lee Loy Seng Foundation 1 




a) London School of Economics and Political Science I 
- Quah Chek Tin 
1 
Total Ties 12 
From the table in above, the CEO has 5 current engagement ties, 2 prior 
engagement ties from past employment, 4 other activity ties, and 1 
education tie. The ties linked with same person but different connection are 
duplicated and computed as well. Hence, the total networks of CEO for 
Batu Kawan Berhad are computed by adding up all ties in above and it is 12 
connections in this case. To confine the outliner effect, this study uses 
natural logarithm value. 
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